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Artificial Intelligence and Patent
Ownership
W. Michael Schuster*
Abstract
Invention by artificial intelligence (AI) is the future of
innovation. Unfortunately, as discovered through Freedom of
Information Act requests, the U.S. patent regime has yet to
determine how it will address patents for inventions created solely
by AI (AI patents). This Article fills that void by presenting the first
comprehensive analysis on the allocation of patent rights arising
from invention by AI. To this end, this Article employs Coase
Theorem and its corollaries to determine who should be allowed to
secure these patents to maximize economic efficiency. The study
concludes that letting firms using AI to create new technologies (as
opposed to software companies, programmers, or downstream
parties) to obtain the resulting patents is the optimal policy.
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I. Introduction
The inventor’s tale is traditionally the story of a lone genius
relentlessly toiling in a garage or attic until achieving a
groundbreaking innovation.1 Although research on iterative
invention has largely discredited this narrative, it remains a
mainstay in the American psyche.2 But while the public struggles
to accept the reality that important discoveries occur via small

1. See Robert L. Park, Science in the Courts, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 575, 585
(2002) (“We have this myth of the lone genius laboring all by himself in his little
workshop in the attic.”); Keith Sawyer, The Collaborative Nature of Innovation,
30 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 293, 312 (2009) (arguing that collaboration has replaced
creativity as the responsibility of “the lone genius, the solitary inventor working
long hours to finish ahead of the competition”).
2. See Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV.
709, 710–11 (2012) (explaining how the “lone genius inventor” is a myth by
illustrating the true factual accounts of Thomas Edison’s, Bell’s, and the Wright
Brothers’ inventions); Erin Shinneman, Note, Owning Global Knowledge: The
Rise of Open Innovation and the Future of Patent Law, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 935,
935 (2010) (“[T]he narrative of the lone inventor has faded over the years as
technological advances, especially the internet, have resulted in dramatic
changes to the innovative landscape.”).
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steps,3 an even greater break from the accepted narrative is
forthcoming—invention by non-human parties.4
Artificial intelligence (AI) permeates much of modern
business5 and is increasingly a powerful tool of innovation.6
Inventing computers are routinely used to create new
technologies,7 such as BMW’s recent design of self-driving
automobiles.8 Some analysts believe it is only a short time until AI
is responsible for the majority of invention.9 This raises the issue
of how the patent system should treat technologies created solely

3. See Sawyer, supra note 1, at 313 (explaining how consumers rarely see
how “each innovation builds incrementally on a long history of prior
innovations”).
4. See Liana B. Baker, Tech Moguls Declare Era of Artificial Intelligence,
REUTERS (June 2, 2016, 9:06 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tech-aiconference/tech-moguls-declare-era-of-artifical-intelligence-iduskcn0yp035 (last
visited Dec. 4, 2018) (discussing Elon Musk’s warning that “artificial intelligence
and machine learning will create computers so sophisticated and godlike that
human will need to implant ‘neural laces’ in their brains to keep up”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
5. See id. (explaining how artificial intelligence is used in “web search
systems, marketing recommendation functions and security and financial trading
programs” and predicting it will spread to healthcare, education, and financial
services).
6. See Rory Cellan-Jones, Stephen Hawking Warns Artificial Intelligence
Could End Mankind, BBC (Dec. 2, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology30290540 (last visited Dec. 4, 2018) (explaining Stephen Hawking’s concerns
about machine learning advancements that will surpass human intelligence and
potentially eliminate the human race) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
7. See Baker, supra note 4 (explaining how artificial intelligence technology
will allow for the innovation of driverless cars and service robots).
8. See Bernard Marr, How BMW Uses Artificial Intelligence and Big Data
to Design and Build Cars of Tomorrow, FORBES (Aug. 1, 2017, 12:28 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2017/08/01/how-bmw-uses-artificialintelligence-and-big-data-to-design-and-build-cars-of-tomorrow/#450c6f2a2b91
(last visited Dec. 4, 2018) (discussing how BMW used artificial intelligence to
create self-driving virtual chauffeur software) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
9. See Ryan Abbott, I Think, Therefore I Invent: Creative Computers and
the Future of Patent Law, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1079, 1080 (2016) (“Soon computers will
be routinely inventing, and it may only be a matter of time until computers are
responsible for most innovation.”).

1948

75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1945 (2018)

by computers with insufficient human engagement to recognize a
human inventor (AI inventions).10
Patents have been granted on technologies designed
exclusively by software,11 but in these situations, AI’s part in the
innovation was not disclosed to the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (the “USPTO” or “Patent Office”).12 These
patentees chose not to mention the computer’s invention13 due to
uncertainty about the law.14 The question of whether, and to
whom, patents can be granted for AI inventions has yet to be
addressed by the legislature or courts,15 though several countries
plan to do so in the near future.16
Regarding domestic policy, the USPTO has no internal
guidelines on AI inventions.17 The Author filed a Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) request seeking all promulgations or
10. See Charlotte Walker-Osborn & Christopher Chan, Artificial Intelligence
and the Law, ITNOW, March 2017, at 36–37 (“[T]he law envisages an individual
as the inventor who contributes to conception of an invention and, yet, there is no
concept of a computer being able to conceive of a patentable invention.”).
11. See Abbott, supra note 9, at 1084–87 (describing the granted patents of
two AI-created computational inventions); see also Ben Hattenbach & Joshua
Glucoft, Patents in an Era of Infinite Monkeys and Artificial Intelligence, 19 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 32, 44 (2015) (“Of a sampling of issued patents that were conceived
wholly or in part by computers, none have ever been subject to litigation.” (citing
U.S. Patent Nos. 4,908,773; 6,847,851; 7,521,463; 7,915,245; 8,053,477; 8,338,464;
8,445,537; 8,450,368; 8,476,273)).
12. See Abbott, supra note 9, at 1085–88 (explaining two AI-created
inventions for which the Patent Office granted patents without knowing about
the non-human inventors’ role).
13. See, e.g., id. at 1088 (providing the example of one patentee whose legal
counsel advised him not to disclose AI’s involvement and considered him and his
team the sole inventors despite the fact that AI created the entire invention).
14. See Hattenbach & Glucoft, supra note 11, at 44 (stating that courts have
not ruled definitively on “whether computer-conceived inventions are patentable”
and discussing the lack of litigation on the issue).
15. See id. (“The courts do not appear to have explicitly ruled on whether
computer-conceived inventions are patentable.”); see also Abbott, supra note 9, at
1099 (“The Patent Act does not directly address the issue of a computer
inventor . . . and there appears to be no case law on the issue of whether a
computer could be an inventor.”).
16. See Walker-Osborn & Chan, supra note 10, at 36–37.
17. See Abbott, supra note 9, at 1099 (“The Patent Office has never issued
guidance addressing the subject [of computer inventors], and there appears to be
no case law on the issue of whether a computer could be an inventor.”).
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directives “to patent examiners instructing them on how to
examine patent applications listing one or more inventor that is
not a human (including software, computers, artificial intelligence,
etc.).”18 In response, the USPTO stated that it had no relevant
information,19 indicating a lack of internal direction on the issue.
This Article provides needed guidance on the efficient
allocation of patent rights, should the USPTO decide to grant AI
patents. The extant literature has, at best, given passing
discussion regarding who should be allowed to secure these
rights.20 To address this void in the literature, the Article employs
one of the primary tools in law and economics: Coase Theorem.21
This proposition holds that aggregate wealth is maximized
through inter-firm transactions where property entitlements are
clearly allocated and transaction costs are zero.22 The second
18. Email from Mike Schuster, Assistant Professor, Okla. State Univ., to
USPTO FOIA Officer, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (Feb. 13, 2017, 09:33
AM) (on file with author) (stating the full request). In full, the request asked for
“[a]ny internal instructions (formal or informal) or promulgations communicated
to patent examiners instructing them on how to examine patent applications
listing one or more inventor that is not a human (including software, computers,
artificial intelligence, etc.).” Id.
19. See Letter from Louis J. Boston, Jr., USPTO FOIA Officer, Office of Gen.
Law, to Mike Schuster, Assistant Professor, Okla. State Univ. (Mar. 9, 2017)
(regarding FOIA Request No. F-17-00124) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
20. See, e.g., Abbott, supra note 9, at 1082 (arguing that computers and
nonhuman authors should qualify as legal inventors, but not analyzing efficient
allocation).
21. Infra Parts III–IV; see also James W. Bowers, The Elementary Economics
of Bijuralism: A First Cut, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 68, 68 n.2 (2002) (“The Coase
Theorem, the fundamental analytical tool of law and economics, holds that if
there were no transaction costs, law would, in economic theory, become
irrelevant.” (citing R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1
(1960))).
22. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, The End of the Market: A Psychoanalysis of
Law and Economics, 112 HARV. L. REV. 483, 527 (1998) (“If one assumes
rationality, no transaction costs, and no legal impediments to bargaining, all
mis-allocations of resources would be fully cured in the market by bargains.”
(citing Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability
Rules—A Comment, 11 J.L. & ECON. 67, 68 (1968))); see also Jeff Sovern, The
Coase Theorem and the Power to Increase Transaction Costs, 40 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 935, 935 n.1 (2009) (“[I]n a regime of zero transaction costs, . . . negotiations
between the parties would lead to those arrangements being made which would
maximize wealth . . . irrespective of the initial assignment of rights.” (citing R.H.
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assumption does not exist in reality,23 but a corollary to the
Theorem is that minimization of transaction costs can effect a real
world situation mimicking the efficient situation predicted by
Coase.24 Based on this corollary, the Article proposes that
efficiency is best attained by allocating AI property rights to
parties that purchase or license AI software and utilize it for
invention (herein called “AI users”).25 These parties hold these
patents in highest value, and thus, aggregate welfare is maximized
by allocating the rights to them.26
The first substantive Part of this study introduces AI and its
capacity to engage in invention, with particular emphasis on
genetic algorithms—a type of software that mimics biological
evolution to reach optimal design parameters.27 Part II continues
by discussing the legal threshold for inventorship and showing
why humans operating inventing software are not inventors. This
Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 713, 717
(1992))).
23. See Jeremy Kidd, Kindergarten Coase, 17 GREEN BAG 2D 141, 145 (2014),
http://www.greenbag.org/v17n2/v17n2_articles_kidd.pdf (providing that the
Coase Theorem describes a world without transaction costs “where bargaining is
perfectly cheap and easy, where there are no physical, technological, emotional,
or other obstacles to bargaining”); see also Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule
Paradigm and the Limits of Contract Law, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 389, 398
(1993) (“Transaction costs obviously exceed zero . . . .”).
24. See Barak Y. Orbach & Frances R. Sjoberg, Excessive Speech, Civility
Norms, and the Clucking Theorem, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1, 8 (2011) (applying the
Coase Theorem to the adoption of legal rules and concluding that in order to
minimize transaction and social costs, states should avoid creating regulations
when possible).
25. Infra Parts III–IV.
26. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Coase Theorem and Arthur Cecil Pigou, 51
ARIZ. L. REV. 633, 638 (2009) (“[I]n cases of high costs of movement, a
legislature . . . could assign the initial allocation to the highest value user so that
movement would not have to occur.” (emphasis added)); see also WERNER Z.
HIRSCH, LAW AND ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 18 (2d. ed. 1988) (“As
transaction costs are reduced, more transactions result and can be carried out
with enhanced efficiency; social welfare is thus increased.”).
27. See Woodrow Barfield, Intellectual Property Rights in Virtual
Environments: Considering the Rights of Owners, Programmers and Virtual
Avatars, 39 AKRON L. REV. 649, 660 (2006) (explaining that generic algorithms
are used to create “intelligent acting” avatars in virtual reality and giving the
example of search procedures using natural selection principles to solve
problems).
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Part concludes by discussing the interplay between AI and
intellectual property laws and then reviewing the extant literature
on how computer creations should be treated under patent law and
the related field of copyright.
Part III introduces Coase Theorem and its pioneering
determination that, assuming no transaction costs, self-interested
parties will reach economic efficiency28 (i.e., allocative efficiency)29
through inter-firm trading if property entitlements are clearly
allocated30 and transactions are costless.31 It is irrelevant to whom
the entitlements are initially assigned, as the party who most
values the property interest will trade to obtain them.32 This
Article applies Coase’s teachings to find that, within the scope of
28. See Bowers, supra note 21, at 61 n.2.
29. This Article specifically refers to allocational or Pareto efficiency when
referencing “economic efficiency.” See infra Part III and note 130; see also Stephen
E. Ellis & Grant M. Hayden, The Cult of Efficiency in Corporate Law, 5 VA. L. &
BUS. REV. 239, 241 (2010) (“When economists discuss efficiency, they are typically
referring to Pareto optimality, also known as Pareto efficiency or allocative
efficiency.”).
30. See Troy A. Rule, Airspace in an Age of Drones, 95 B.U. L. REV. 155, 195
(2015) (“The Coase Theorem suggests that laws that clearly assign initial
entitlements relating to a resource promote allocative efficiency.” (citing R.H.
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 21 (1960))).
31. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15
(1960)(“[I]f such market transactions are costless, such a rearrangement of rights
will always take place if it would lead to an increase in the value of production.”);
see also HIRSCH, supra note 26, at 18 (“As transaction costs are reduced, more
transactions result and can be carried out with enhanced efficiency; social welfare
is thus increased.”); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 10 (8th ed.
2011) (explaining a simplified version of the Coase Theorem as concluding “if
transactions are costless, the initial assignment of a property right will not affect
the ultimate use of the property”); Oxford Org., Ltd. v. Peterson (In re Stotler &
Co.), 144 B.R. 385, 393 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (applying Coase Theorem to bankruptcy
and advocating for the free flow of information to protect investors); Coltman v.
Comm’r, 980 F.2d 1134, 1137 (7th Cir. 1992) (applying Coase Theorem to
conclude: “So long as the rule of law is known when parties act, the ultimate
economic result is the same no matter which way the law has resolved issue”);
Schwartz, supra note 23 at 397–98 (stating that Coase Theorem requires several
assumptions, namely “(a) the parties whom the allocation affects are informed
about relevant economic variables; (b) wealth effects are absent; (c) competitive
markets exist; and (d) the cost of making transactions is zero”).
32. See Stewart J. Schwab, Collective Bargaining and the Coase Theorem, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 245, 265 (1987) (explaining that Coase Theorem predicts that
regardless of entitlement assignments, parties will negotiate and trade to reach
an efficient bargain).
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Coase’s assumptions, an efficient state of affairs will be reached
with regard to AI patent ownership so long as these rights are
clearly defined regardless of the initial assignment of those rights.33
Part IV deviates from the assumption of no transaction costs
and identifies real-world policies that effect the economic efficiency
predicted by Coase. A primary strategy towards this goal is to
assign property entitlements to those who most value the right.34
In that situation, the inter-firm transactions underlying Coase
Theorem become unnecessary because the party who most benefits
from the right (and thus, would always trade to obtain it in the
absence of transaction costs) has it initially allocated to them.35
With this in mind, the Part evaluates a host of parties involved in
the AI invention timeline (e.g., software companies, programmers,
AI users, product engineers, etc.) to determine which one most
values AI patents. As determined through the analysis contained
herein, AI users (firms that purchase AI software and utilize it for
invention) will most value AI patents and, thus, should be entitled
to obtain these patents to maximize economic efficiency.36
II. Background
For purposes of patent law, an “inventor” is the party “who
conceived [an] invention,”37 and he has the right to obtain a patent
on the technology.38 Simply coming up with an amorphous idea is
33. Infra Part III.
34. See Daniel B. Kelly, Toward Economic Analysis of the Uniform Probate
Code, 45 U. MICH. J.L. Reform 855, 865 (2012) (“Because transaction costs may
prevent parties from bargaining to achieve the optimal outcome, Coase suggests
that courts should attempt to award an entitlement to the party that values it the
most.” (citing Hovenkamp, supra note 26, at 638)).
35. See Hovenkamp, supra note 26, at 638 (“[I]n cases of high costs of
movement, a legislature . . . could assign the initial allocation to the highest value
user so that movement would not have to occur.” (emphasis added)).
36. Infra Part IV.
37. See C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., 157 F.3d 1340, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“The
‘inventor’ in patent law, is the person or persons who conceived the patented
invention.” (citing Collar Co. v. Van Dusen, 90 U.S. 530, 563–64 (1874);
Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1227–28 (Fed. Cir.
1994))).
38. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (declaring that Congress has the power
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insufficient;39 to qualify as an inventor, one must identify the
“definite and permanent idea of the invention as it will be used in
practice.”40 But what happens where AI independently creates a
patentable invention, and humans are merely non-inventing
onlookers?41
This Article explores the question of who should own patent
rights arising from computer invention with insufficient human
contribution to warrant identification of a human inventor.42 The
study does not address situations where AI and a human are
co-inventors, such that the human can obtain a patent under
current precedent. With this in mind, the current Part reviews the
state of AI technology and applicable law.
A. Artificial Intelligence Technology

“to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts by securing for limited Times
to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries”).
39. See Oasis Research, LLC v. Carbonite, Inc., No. 4:10-CV-00435, 2015 WL
123642, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2015), motion to certify appeal denied, No.
4:10-CV-435, 2015 WL 12829617 (E.D. Tex. June 11, 2015) (explaining the need
for a definite idea rather than a mere general one).
40. Burroughs, 40 F.3d at 1229 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see also Garrett Corp. v.
United States, 422 F.2d 874, 881 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (“One who merely suggests an idea
of a result to be accomplished, rather than means of accomplishing it, is not a
joint inventor.” (citing Forgie v. Oil-Well Supply Co., 58 F. 871 (3d Cir. 1893)));
Worden v. Fisher, 11 F. 505 (E.D. Mich. 1882))).
41. See, e.g., Dom Galeon & Sarah Marquart, Expert: When an AI Invents
Something, It Should Be Credited as the Inventor, FUTURISM (Nov. 8, 2016),
https://futurism.com/expert-when-an-ai-invents-something-it-should-becredited-as-the-inventor/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2018) (noting that nonhuman
inventors created the Oral-B CrossAction toothbrush, several music
compositions, and some food recipes) (on file with the Washing and Lee Law
Review).
42. See generally Hattenbach & Glucoft, supra note 11 (addressing a similar
question of who should be credited with patent ownership of computer-generated
technologies and how publication of such material might prevent others from
obtaining patents on other inventions); see also Kalin Hristov, Artificial
Intelligence and the Copyright Dilemma, 57 IDEA 431, 435 (2017) (discussing
“works generated by AI programs with the direct guidance, assistance or input of
human beings”).
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AI encompasses any technology undertaking an activity that,
if done by a human, would require intelligence.43 In the current
“Era of Artificial Intelligence,”44 smart computers are creating
original cuisine,45 designing the next generation of luxury
automobiles,46 tracking hate crimes,47 and composing music.48 Of
interest to this Article, of course, is the use of AI to invent new
things.49
There are many manners by which computers autonomously
engage in activities that require “intelligence.”50 For example,
43. See DANIEL CREVIER, AI: THE TUMULTUOUS HISTORY OF THE SEARCH FOR
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 9 (1993); Marvin L. Minsky, Artificial Intelligence, SCI.
AM., Sept. 1966, at 247.
44. See Baker, supra note 4 (stating that Tech CEOs dubbed the present as
the “Era of Artificial Intelligence”).
45. See Hattenbach & Glucoft, supra note 11, at 34 (providing that IBM’s
Watson supercomputer created and predicted the appeal of “quadrillions of
different ingredient combinations” (citing Leah Hunter, How Creative Can
Computers Be?, FAST COMPANY (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.fastcompany.com/302
7293/how-creative-can-computers-be (last visited Dec. 4, 2018) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review))).
46. See Marr, supra note 8 (discussing the use of artificial intelligence to
create self-driving virtual chauffeur software).
47. See David Z. Morris, Google’s New Site Uses Artificial Intelligence to
Track
Hate
Crimes,
FORTUNE
(Aug.
19,
2017),
http://fortune.com/2017/08/19/google-propublica-artificial-intelligence-hatecrimes/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2018) (explaining a tool that uses machine learning to
understand the intent behind hate crimes documented in news reports) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
48. See Katherine Bourzac, A Neuromorphic Chip that Makes Music, IEEE
SPECTRUM (May 23, 2017 1:00
PM), http://spectrum.ieee.org/techtalk/robotics/artificial-intelligence/a-neuromorphic-chip-that-makes-music (last
visited Dec. 4, 2018) (explaining a neuromorphic chip that uses brain-inspired
circuits to compose melodies) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
49. See, e.g., RAY KURZWEIL, HOW TO CREATE A MIND: THE SECRET OF HUMAN
THOUGHT REVEALED 124 (2012) (discussing attempts to digitally replicate brain
functioning of a roundworm and, eventually, of a human); see also John Mannes,
Autodesk Generative Design Takes in Constraints and Makes Its Own 3D Models,
TECHCRUNCH.COM
(June
26,
2017),
https://techcrunch.com/2017/06/26/
generative-design/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2018) (“The software takes in engineering
constraints and generates a bunch of potential designs that can either be
immediately put to use or used as a jumping-off point for new creations.”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
50. See, e.g., Erica Fraser, Computers as Inventors: Legal and Policy
Implications of Artificial Intelligence on Patent Law, 13 SCRIPT-ED 305, 315–19
(2016) (explaining how artificial intelligence employs genetic programming,
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neural networks are engineered to mimic human brain activity to
Fuzzy
logic
employs
“learn”
relevant
information.51
decision-making
algorithms
that—rather
than
making
assessments premised solely on binary answers to relevant
questions—base their output on information that may be partially
true or vague, as is common in the real world.52 While each of these
may be employed to create new technology,53 the below gives a
more thorough analysis to a single example of inventing software.54
Genetic algorithms independently develop new inventions by
mimicking biological evolution55 via “an iterative process of
artificial neural networks, and robot scientists to invent new technologies).
51. See Dana S. Rao, Neural Networks: Here, There, and Everywhere—An
Examination of Available Intellectual Property Protection for Neural Networks in
Europe and the United States, 30 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 509, 509 (1997)
(explaining how neural networks learn and generalize information to solve
problems that exceed the scope of their initial training); see also Serge Jorgensen,
Convergence of Forensics, E-Discovery, Security, & Law, 12 AVE MARIA L. REV.
291, 291 n.3 (2014) (providing that neural networks attempt to imitate the way
the brain works by “creating connections between processing elements” (citing
Neural Network, WEBOPEDIA, https://www.webopedia.com/TERM/N/neural_
network.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
52. See Joseph S. Bird, Cognitive Neuroscience as a Model for Neural
Software Patent Examination, 31 AIPLA Q.J. 273, 297 (2003) (explaining that
fuzzy logic is “multi-valued logic with intermediate values to be defined between
conventional binary evaluations like zero/one or yes/no” and thus can represent
ambiguous knowledge); see also Bart Kosko & Satoru Isaka, Fuzzy Logic, SCI.
AM., July 1993, at 76 (“Fuzzy logic manipulates such vague concepts as warm or
still dirty and so helps engineers to build air conditioners, washing machines and
other devices . . . .” (internal quotations omitted)).
53. See Fraser, supra note 50, at 315–19 (explaining how artificial
intelligence employs genetic programming, artificial neural networks, and robot
scientists to invent new technologies, such as NASA’s satellite antennas,
electronic toothbrushes, and drug-resistant malaria research identification).
54. Unless specifically identified, the use of the terms “artificial intelligence”
and “AI” should be understood herein to reference any type thereof.
55. See Abbott, supra note 9, at 1086 (explaining how genetic programming
emulates the “simple processes” of “mutation, sexual recombination, and natural
selection” to generate patentable results and achieve machine intelligence); see
also KURZWEIL, supra note 49, at 147 (explaining the use of genetic algorithms to
set “God parameters” by coding potential solutions, defining a list of parameters
and randomly generating thousands of genetic codes); John R.
Koza, Human-Competitive Results Produced by Genetic Programming,
in 11 GENETIC PROGRAMMING AND EVOLVABLE MACHINES 251, 265 (2010)
(providing thirty-one instances in which genetic programming produced a human
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simulated competition and improvement.”56 This type of AI
functions to optimize a set of design parameters, with each
parameter being analogized to a single gene within a larger
chromosome.57 The computer initially creates a fixed number of
chromosomes with random values for their constituent genes—
forming several sets of parameters with random attributes.58 The
resultant chromosomes are run through a cost function59 to
determine the best performing sets of parameters, and poorly
performing chromosomes are discarded.60 The process further
competitive result that duplicated the functionality of a previously patented
invention); John R. Koza et al., Evolving Inventions, SCI. AM., Feb. 2003, at 52
(discussing how computer programmers use software versions of evolutionary
processes to achieve machine intelligence). Genetic algorithms were initially
developed in the mid-1970s by Professor John Holland. See Donald T. Hornstein,
Complexity Theory, Adaptation, and Administrative Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 913, 936–
37 (2005) (describing genetic algorithms as a “paradigm for harnessing the power
of adaption”).
56. KURZWEIL, supra note 49, at 148.
57. See RANDY L. HAUPT & SUE ELLEN HAUPT, PRACTICAL GENETIC
ALGORITHMS 19, 30 (2d ed. 2004) (providing and applying background on cellular
heredity to cost functions of genetic algorithms); see also KURZWEIL, supra note
49, at 148 (discussing the process of enabling solutions to emerge by rejecting the
iterative cycles with no generation improvements and using the best designs in
the last generation).
58. See HAUPT & HAUPT, supra note 57, at 36, 52 (explaining how the gene
can represent a binary setting or some parameter within an array of potential
entries because the genetic algorithm assigns random numbers to a group of
chromosomes, or population, which it later converts to floating-point numbers);
KURZWEIL, supra note 49, at 147 (“First, we determine a way to code possible
solutions . . . . [T]hen we define a list of all of the parameters . . . . Then we
randomly generate thousands or more genetic codes.”). “The population size
affects both the ultimate performance and the efficiency of GA’s. GA’s generally
do poorly with very small populations, because the population provides an
insufficient sample size for most hyperplanes. A large population is more likely
to contain representatives from a large number of [potential solutions].” J.J.
Grefenstette, Optimization of Control Parameters for Genetic Algorithms, in BILL
P. BUCKLES & FREDERICK E. PETRY, GENETIC ALGORITHMS 7 (1992) (internal
citation omitted). “On the other hand, a large population requires more
evaluations per generation, possibly resulting in an unacceptably slow rate of
convergence.” Id.
59. See Preston C. Green, III et. al., Race-Conscious Funding Strategies and
School Finance Litigation, 16 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 39, 49 (2006) (“Cost function
analysis is a statistical method which determines the costs associated with
attaining a particular set of outcomes . . . .”).
60. See KURZWEIL, supra note 49, at 148 (describing how researchers “run
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mimics natural selection by allowing the best performing
candidates to survive and “mate” (i.e., trading values for some
subset of their attributes with another set of parameters to
produce “children”).61 This methodology ensures a variety of
attribute combinations is tested62 and is repeated until the entire
population (the number of initial chromosomes) has been filled
with the remaining parents and their children.63
The AI lastly ensures that a large variety of genetic pairings
are explored by randomly altering (“mutating”) some subset of
parameters.64 Mutation rates are selected to be high enough to
ensure some variability, but sufficiently low to guarantee
continuation of preferred attributes.65 The process then begins
again with the remaining population of chromosomes subjected to
the cost function to determine which sets of parameters perform
each program generated by the parameters and judge it on appropriate criteria
(did it complete the task, how long did it take, and so on)”); HAUPT & HAUPT, supra
note 57, at 36, 54 (explaining that only the strongest chromosomes survive). This
determination can be made so the best-performing X% of the population is
retained, chromosomes satisfying some performance threshold are retained, or
via some other methodology of retention. Id. at 36–38. “Deciding how many
chromosomes to keep is somewhat arbitrary. Letting only a few chromosomes
survive to the next generation limits the available genes in the offspring. Keeping
too many chromosomes allows bad performers chance to contribute their traits to
the next generation.” Id. at 38.
61. See RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 33 (1976) (explaining how
natural selection encourages species to mimic those with more advantageous
genetic traits); HAUPT & HAUPT, supra note 57, at 38–41, 56 (demonstrating that
the selection of chromosomes to be paired together can be done in a variety of
manners, including random pairing and weighting the likelihood of procreation
based on the level of performance).
62. See Grefenstette, supra note 58, at 6 (explaining that the “power of GA’s
derives largely from their ability to exploit efficiently [a] vast amount of
accumulating knowledge by means of relatively simple selection mechanisms”).
63. See KURZWEIL, supra note 49, at 148 (explaining that the researchers
“cause each of the survivors to multiply themselves until they reach the same
number” as the initial population).
64. See HAUPT & HAUPT, supra note 57, at 43 (describing how mutations
occur in the genetic algorithm and the benefits of altering the chromosomes);
Grefenstette, supra note 58, at 7 (“Mutation is a secondary search operator which
increases the variability of the population. After selection, each bit position of
each structure in the new population undergoes a random change with the
probability equal to the mutation rate M.”).
65. See Grefenstette, supra note 58, at 7 (explaining how mutation levels
that are too high or too low negatively affect an experiment).

1958

75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1945 (2018)

best.66 Iterations continue for a specified number of repetitions or
until an acceptable level of performance is achieved.67
This type of inventing software has proven effective.68 General
Electric utilized genetic algorithms to design jet engines that
outperform existing units.69 Hitachi used the technology to create
a quieter bullet train nose case with better aerodynamics.70
Likewise, genetic algorithms have created novel communications
systems, diesel engines, pharmaceuticals, and power plant
turbines.71
Beyond the above discussion about what AI is, it is notable to
define what it is not. Alongside the expanding scope of rights for
non-human corporations,72 some have discussed personhood for AI
66. See HAUPT & HAUPT, supra note 57, at 44 (“After the mutations take
place, the costs associated with the offspring and mutated chromosomes are
calculated . . . . The process described is iterated.”).
67. See id. at 47, 52, 62 (describing the point at which the researcher should
stop the genetic algorithm).
68. See Ray Kurzweil, The Virtual Thomas Edison, TIME (Dec. 3, 2018),
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,90538-1,00.html
(last
visited Dec. 4, 2018) (“The results of [using genetic algorithms] can be
surprisingly effective, often solving difficult engineering and other design
problems.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
69. See id. (“General Electric also uses genetic algorithms, in the design of
jet engines . . . .”).
70. See ROBERT PLOTKIN, THE GENIE IN THE MACHINE: HOW
COMPUTER-AUTOMATED INVENTING IS REVOLUTIONIZING LAW AND BUSINESS 60
(2009) (explaining how genetic algorithms optimized the design and performance
of the bullet train).
71. See Peter M. Kohlhepp, When the Invention is an Inventor: Revitalizing
Patentable Subject Matter to Exclude Unpredictable Processes, 93 MINN. L. REV.
779, 786–87 (2008) (“Virginia engineers designed a novel and effective satellite
communications antenna.” (citing Anne Eisenberg, When a Gizmo Can Invent a
Gizmo, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1999, at G9)); PLOTKIN, supra note 70, at 60
(explaining that a genetic algorithm “produced such a significant improvement in
the efficiency of the drug discovery process that it has become the most-used
software by 1,500 computational chemists at Pfizer” (citing Interview by Robert
Plotkin with David Fogel (Sept. 20, 2007))); Liza Vertinsky & Todd M. Rice,
Thinking About Thinking Machines: Implications of Machine Inventors for Patent
Law, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 574, 581 (2002) (discussing how genetic algorithms
increased the efficiency of turbines by five percent).
72. See Ronit Donyets-Kedar, Challenging Corporate Personhood Theory:
Reclaiming the Public, 11 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 61, 61–62 (2017) (“Two recent
landmark decisions by the American Supreme Court, Citizens United and Hobby
Lobby, have expanded constitutional protections for corporations to include First
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in fields such as real property ownership,73 maritime regulations,74
and constitutional law.75 The current discussion assumes that AI
is not an entity that will be granted personhood rights under
patent law, and it will not be able to own AI patents.76 Should that
happen, the instant question—pertaining to who should own AI
patents—becomes moot.
B. The Legal Threshold for Inventorship
This subpart analyzes precedent regarding what constitutes
invention for patenting purposes and uses it to show why humans
using AI to create new technologies do not satisfy this threshold. A
primary requirement for inventorship is “mak[ing] a significant
contribution to the invention.”77 To meet this standard, one must
bring about a “definite and permanent idea of the invention
Amendment rights and the right to religious liberty.”); Anna Gentry, Corporate
Personhood and Nonprofit Director Duty of Obedience: Legal Implications That
Necessitate Expanded Standing to Sue, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 165, 186 (2015)
(“[B]eginning in the 1960s, corporations saw a massive expansion of legal rights
and protections.”).
73. See David Marc Rothenberg, Can Siri 10.0 Buy Your Home? The Legal
and Policy Based Implications of Artificial Intelligent Robots Owning Real
Property, 11 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 439, 447 (2016) (“Because of the moral
principles tied to real property ownership, this right must be carefully scrutinized
before it is extended to autonomous artificial intelligent entities . . . .”).
74. See Michal Chwedczuk, Analysis of the Legal Status of Unmanned
Commercial Vessels in U.S. Admiralty and Maritime Law, 47 J. MAR. L. & COM.
123, 164 (2016) (discussing the liability implications of using artificial intelligence
on ships).
75. See Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70
N.C. L. REV. 1231, 1255 (1992) (addressing the question of whether the
Constitution should extend to artificial intelligence).
76. But see Fraser, supra note 50, at 330 (discussing the possibility of
“recognising computers as legal persons” with regard to inventing activity); Jason
Tashea, Estonia Considering New Legal Status for Artificial Intelligence, ABA
(Oct. 20, 2017, 1:10 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/estonia_
considering_new_legal_status_for_ai/?utm_campaign==tech_monthlyabajournal
.com/news/article/e (last visited Dec. 4, 2018) (“Estonia is considering a legal
status for artificial intelligence beyond property.”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
77. Netscape Commc’ns Corp. v. ValueClick, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 2d 699, 721
(E.D. Va. 2010), on reconsideration in part, 704 F. Supp. 2d 544 (E.D. Va. 2010)
(citing Pannu v. Iolab Corp., 155 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
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[sufficient to allow] a skilled artisan [to] carry out the invention
without undue experimentation.”78 This requirement is not
satisfied by merely providing information describing the state of
the art.79 On this point, the Federal Circuit’s Nartron Corp. v.
Schukra U.S.A., Inc.80 is instructive.81
Nartron turned on whether Mr. Joseph Benson was an
inventor of a massaging car seat.82 Benson alleged inventorship
because he suggested the use of an “extender for a lumbar support
adjustor” in the patented invention.83 No one contested that he
recommended use of this element, but neither did anyone dispute
that this component was common in prior inventions.84 The court
resolved the issue by recognizing that Benson’s suggestion only
mimicked the existing state of technology, and thus, showed no
ability beyond that of one of ordinary skill in the art.85 Because
simply providing information about the current state of the art is
not an invention, Benson was held not to be an inventor.86

78. Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1229–30 (Fed.
Cir. 1994). The logic of this holding is exemplified in the Supreme Court’s 1847
Wood v. Underhill, 46 U.S. 1 (1847), opinion—dealing with patent
enablement— which held that where a patent “gives only the names of the
substances which are to be mixed together, without stating any relative
proportion, undoubtedly it would be the duty of the court to declare the patent to
be void.” Id. at 6.
79. See Nartron Corp. v. Schukra U.S.A. Inc., 558 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (“One who simply . . . explains the state of the art without ever having a
firm and definite idea of the claimed combination as a whole does not qualify as
a joint inventor.” (quoting Ethicon Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1460
(Fed. Cir. 1998))).
80. 558 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
81. See id. (describing the requirements for inventorship).
82. See id. at 1353 (finding that Benson was not an inventor because he
“provided only an insignificant contribution to the invention”).
83. Id. at 1357.
84. See id. at 1355 (“[Benson] admits that the idea of an extender for a
lumbar support adjustor in an automobile seat was in the prior art.”).
85. See id. at 1358 (“Benson’s contribution of the extender amounted to
‘nothing more than explaining to the inventors what the then state of the art was
and supplying a product to them for use in their invention.’” (quoting Hess v.
Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 106 F.3d 976, 981 (Fed. Cir. 1997))).
86. See id. (reversing the district court to hold that Benson was not a
co-inventor).
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In addition, “[o]ne who merely suggests an idea of a result to
be accomplished, rather than means of accomplishing it, is not [an]
inventor.”87 This rule is embodied by the Eastern District of
Texas’s Oasis Research, LLC v. Carbonite, Inc.,88 wherein
Carbonite argued that Mr. Jack Byrd should have been included
as an inventor on a data-handling patent.89 Carbonite proffered
that Byrd “conceived the idea for a remote online backup service”
in the early 1990s.90 Lacking skills needed to create the technology,
he passed the project to other employees and had nothing further
to do with it.91 The court reasoned that—due to his failure to
participate in the actual creation of the invention beyond
identifying a goal—Byrd was not an inventor.92
A related line of cases hold that employing another party to
invent does not make one an inventor.93 This proposition, for
example, set forth in TS Holdings, Inc. v. Schwab94 from the
Eastern District of Michigan is instructive. Therein, Mr. Barry
Schwab was hired to create a “video product to be used in
automobile marketing.”95 Schwab obtained a patent on the
subsequent invention, and his employer later alleged that he
87. Garrett Corp. v. United States, 422 F.2d 874, 881 (Ct. Cl. 1970). Garret
Corp. has been cited by the Federal Circuit for this proposition. See Nartron Corp.,
558 F.3d at 1359 (adopting the rule stated in Garrett Corp.); Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Aradigm Corp., 376 F.3d 1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (adopting the rule stated in
Garrett Corp. as well); see also Drone Techs., Inc. v. Parrot S.A., 838 F.3d 1283,
1306 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (applying the Garrett Corp. rule); Netscape Commc’ns Corp.,
684 F. Supp. 2d at 721 (explaining that the Garrett Corp. rule is well-established).
88. No. 4:10-CV-00435, 2015 WL 123642 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2015).
89. See id. at *6 (listing Byrd’s contributions to the patents in question).
90. Id. at *3.
91. See id. at *6–7 (detailing Byrd’s role in creating the invention).
92. See id. at *7 (“[T]he contributions made by Byrd merely suggest an idea
of a result to be accomplished . . . rather than a means of accomplishing it.”).
93. See Nartron Corp. v. Schukra U.S.A. Inc., 558 F.3d 1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (explaining that an “entrepreneur’s request to another to create a product
that will fulfill a certain function” does not make the entrepreneur an inventor
(quoting Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 937 F. Supp. 1015, 1035 (D. Conn.
1996))); TS Holdings, Inc. v. Schwab, No. 09-CV-13632, 2011 WL 13205959, at *4
(E.D. Mich. Dec. 16, 2011) (categorizing one who hires another to complete the
invention as the owner, not the inventor).
94. No. 09-CV-13632, 2011 WL 13205959 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 16, 2011).
95. Id. at *1.
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should be included as an inventor.96 The court disagreed, rebuffing
arguments that Schwab’s employer was an inventor because he
“financed the reduction to practice” and was the initial reason
Schwab began work on the invention.97 Because providing
monetary support and instructing others to create new technology
are not sufficient to constitute invention, Schwab’s employer was
not an inventor.98
This precedent establishes that a human using inventing AI is
not an inventor for purposes of patent law.99 To initiate AI
invention, a person may input seed information,100 including
existing technologies, e.g., for neural networks,101 or relevant
parameters to be optimized, e.g., for genetic algorithms.102 Such
acts merely provide the AI with access to existing knowledge in the
field, which Nartron held is not invention.103
After uploading this information, a human may identify a
technology to invent or technological field within which to
invent.104 For instance, one piece of inventing software—the
Invention Machine—requires a user to input “specifications for a
desired result,” which the AI will seek to satisfy.105 Genetic
96. See id. at *2 (“[The employer] filed suit against Schwab, claiming that he
is a co-inventor . . . .”).
97. Id. at *4 (citing Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d
1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
98. See id. (“[T]here is no legal basis for [the] assertion that financing such
reduction to practice equates to invention itself.”).
99. See Hattenbach & Glucoft, supra note 11, at 46 (“[I]t seems highly
unlikely that courts would bestow inventorship status on a computer.”).
100. See Abbott, supra note 9, at 1094 (“Computers require some amount of
human input to generate creative output.”).
101. See Fraser, supra note 50, at 317–18 (explaining how Artificial Neural
Networks, a form of AI, mimic brain activity to accelerate technological
development).
102. See HAUPT & HAUPT, supra note 57, at 36, 52; Watson Cooks Up
Computational Creativity, IBM, https://perma.cc/GGV7-NHT4 (last visited Dec.
4, 2018) (listing the parameters that developers placed on a computer program to
create recipes) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
103. See Nartron Corp., 558 F.3d at 1358 (explaining that one who merely
describes the state of the art is not an inventor).
104. See Abbott, supra note 9, at 1094 (describing the role humans play in
computer-generated inventions).
105. Id. at 1087 (citing Telephone Interview with John Koza, President,
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algorithms may also be set to meet a particular set of performance
parameters.106 Inputting these parameters is not invention. As
made clear in Oasis Research, identification of a goal or technology
to be created by others (be it AI or another human) is insufficient
to constitute invention.107
Lastly, the fact that a human finances, owns, or operates AI is
insufficient to qualify that person as an inventor.108 As made clear
in TS Holdings, financing or initiating the process of invention
(e.g., by setting inventors to task) does not satisfy the standard to
be named on a patent.109 In such situations, a person may be
responsible for an invention, but they have not actually invented a
new technology.110 This subpart establishes that humans may not
an inventor where AI is involved. The following subpart evaluates
how this issue has been addressed in the literature.
C. Literature Review of Artificial Intelligence and Intellectual
Property Law
The interplay of intellectual property law and computer
creations (both inventions and works of authorship) has been the
subject of some scholarship.111 This subpart reviews the literature
Genetic Programming Inc. (Jan. 22, 2016)).
106. See HAUPT & HAUPT, supra note 57, at 47, 52, 62 (discussing how genetic
algorithms can be run until a particular goal, set by the user, is satisfied).
107. See Oasis Research, LLC v. Carbonite, Inc., No. 4:10-CV-00435, 2015 WL
123642, at *7 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2015) (declining to extend inventorship to one
who “merely suggest[ed] an idea of a result to be accomplished . . . rather than a
means of accomplishing it”); see also Eli Lilly & Co. v. Aradigm Corp., 376 F.3d
1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“One who merely suggests an idea of a result to be
accomplished, rather than a means of accomplishing it, is not a joint inventor.”
(quoting Garrett Corp. v. United States, 422 F.2d 874, 881 (Ct. Cl. 1970))).
108. See TS Holdings, Inc. v. Schwab, No. 09-CV-13632, 2011 WL 13205959,
at *4 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 16, 2011) (“[T]here is no legal basis for [the] assertion that
financing such reduction to practice equates to invention itself.”).
109. See id. (declining to classify someone who hires another to develop the
invention as an inventor).
110. See id. at *6 (“Ownership of a patent application guaranties neither
inventorship nor ownership of subsequent continuations-in-part . . . .”).
111. See generally Ralph D. Clifford, Intellectual Property in the Era of the
Creative Computer Program: Will the True Creator Please Stand Up?, 71 TUL. L.
REV. 1675 (1997) (arguing that computer generated inventions cannot qualify for
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pertaining to whether AI patents can be constitutionally granted,
application of patent laws to AI inventions, and copyright’s
interplay with computer-generated works—a relevant subject
because patents and copyrights issue pursuant to a common
enumerated power (the Intellectual Property (IP) Clause).112
Early legal commentary discussed whether AI patents and
copyrights could be issued pursuant to the IP Clause, which allows
Congress to grant these rights to “authors and inventors.”113
Clifford argues that copyright and patent statutes both implicitly
require that “a human must creatively toil to produce the
[authorship or invention,]” and this limitation should be read into
the IP Clause.114 In contrast, Miller asserts that there are no
caselaw, statutory, or policy limitations inhibiting the extension of
authorship (and by implication, inventorship) to computers.115 On
the issue, the Supreme Court stated that—with regard to the IP
Clause—terms such as authors and inventors “have not been
construed in their narrow literal sense but, rather, with the reach
necessary to reflect the broad scope of constitutional
principles.”116 This Article proceeds assuming such precedent
renders AI patents constitutional.117
copyright protection); Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer
Programs, Databases, and Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since
CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 977 (1993) (arguing that copyright law would protect
computer generated inventions).
112. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (establishing intellectual property rights).
113. Id.
114. Clifford, supra note 111, at 1701 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
115. See Miller, supra note 111, at 1067 n.445 (arguing that computers could
be considered copyright authors).
116. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973).
117. The IP Clause has previously been used as a source of legislative
authority to grant copyrights to other non-human entities, e.g., corporations. See
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Since the early 1900s, copyright law has provided
that an employer is the author of a “work made for hire.” See Easter Seal Soc’y
for Crippled Children and Adults of La., Inc. v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 325
(5th Cir. 1987) (explaining the progression of the interpretation of the “work for
hire” doctrine and providing the current statutory definition under 17 U.S.C. § 1);
Catherine L. Fisk, Authors at Work: The Origins of the Work-for-Hire Doctrine, 15
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 5 (2003) (“The creation of the modern [work for hire]
doctrine preceded its first appearance in the federal Copyright Act of
1909 . . . . The concept began to appear after 1860, though no case actually
applied such a rule until a pair of cases did so in 1899 and 1900.”). In these
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Initial scholarship likewise addressed AI invention’s impact
on the scope of patentable subject matter.118 Plotkin analyzed how
the “ubiquity of artificial invention technology” influences the
non-obviousness requirement,119 concluding that AI expands the
scope of obvious discoveries and therefore narrows the breadth of
patentable inventions.120 Recognizing the same issue, Ravid and
instances, a business is deemed the author of works prepared by employees in the
scope of their employment. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012) (providing that the buyer
is the author if the work is made for hire); id. § 101 (defining “work made for
hire”). This interpretation of “author” deviates from the traditional
understanding that an author is the party that actually reduces an expression to
a tangible form and expands the definition to include non-human parties, e.g.,
corporations. See SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
AUT-AWY (10th ed. 1792); WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 72 (3d ed. 1917)
(providing a definition of “author” as being an originator—which could potentially
include an employer— but also providing another definition stating that an author
is the first to write something).
118. See PLOTKIN, supra note 70, at 111 (exploring the idea of AI inventions
and whether AI inventions may be patentable).
119. Id.; see also Brenda M. Simon, The Implications of Technological
Advancement for Obviousness, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 331, 333
(2013) (“As access to searchable information and computing capabilities expand,
it might appear that very few inventions are nonobvious enough to merit patent
protection.”); Brenda M. Simon, Rules, Standards, and the Reality of Obviousness,
65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 25, 33 (2014) (“Advances in technology have muddled the
definition of the PHOSITA and the scope of the prior art—two central factors in
the determination of obviousness.”).
120. See PLOTKIN, supra note 70, at 102 (“Supply every engineer with
state-of-the-art artificial invention technology and train them in how to use that
technology, and you have effectively boosted the level of ordinary inventive skill
in the field . . . .”); id. at 112 (“What this means is that the patent examiner will
need to ask whether an inventor of ordinary skill, using artificial invention
technology, would have found the invention at issue obvious.”). On the contrary,
Plotkin recognized that if patent examiners do not acknowledge that those of
ordinary skill in the art utilize invention technologies, inventors can employ these
technologies to create vast numbers of patentable inventions that are obvious
using advanced technologies but would not have been obvious without the
technology (and thus are patentable under the “old standard”). See id. at 107
(explaining that if patents inventors do not take into account the effect of publicly
available “artificial invention technology” on the inventor of ordinary skill, then
there may be a “patent flood” for patents on obvious inventions); see also William
Samore, Artificial Intelligence and the Patent System: Can a New Tool Render a
Once Patentable Idea Obvious?, 29 SYRACUSE J. SCI. & TECH. L. 113, 142 (2013)
(arguing the widespread use of genetic programming will “change invention and
creative thinking” and make previously non-obvious inventions obvious and
non-patentable); Saurabh Vishnubhakat, The Antitrusting of Patentability, 48
SETON HALL L. REV. 71, 95 (2017) (discussing the identification of what constitutes
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Liu argue that—rather than revising the law on
obviousness—Congress should avoid the topic and simply not
grant AI patents.121 Hattenbach and Glucoft disagreed, asserting
that patents could arise from computer-generated patent claims
describing new technologies.122
Abbott has likewise addressed the issue of whether AI can be
an “inventor” and if its inventions should be patentable.123 Viewing
the issue through the Constitution’s mandate that patent law
incentivizes inventive activity, Abbott concluded AI patents
encourage the creation of inventing machines (and the resultant
inventions).124 Abbott’s paper briefly discussed ownership of these
patents, finding that a software’s owner/licensor should receive
any patent rights.125
In a directly analogous field, scholars have addressed whether
AI creations are copyrightable, and if so, who ought to own the
rights.126 Samuelson concluded that a computer’s user should own
any copyright arising therefrom, as that party was most
responsible for satisfying the requirements for copyright.127 In
contrast, Wu argued that where a work is not attributable to a
computer user or software programmer, “the court should assign
a person having ordinary skill).
121. See Shlomit Yanisky Ravid & Xiaoqiong (Jackie) Liu, When Artificial
Intelligence Systems Produce Inventions: The 3A Era and an Alternative Model
for Patent Law, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 2215, 2215 (2018) (arguing the current patent
system is “outdated, inapplicable, and irrelevant with respect to inventions
created by AI systems”).
122. See Hattenbach & Glucoft, supra note 11, at 50 (arguing that if a
computer-generated claim meets all the requirements for a patentable invention,
then those types of inventions should be patentable); see also Technology, CLOEM,
https://www.cloem.com/flat/technology/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2018) (explaining
“Cloem technology combines human [patent] drafting and machine drafting”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
123. See Abbott, supra note 9, at 1081 (examining whether a computer can be
an inventor and whether “computational inventions” are patentable).
124. See id. at 1104 (arguing that making AI patentable will encourage people
to invent); Fraser, supra note 53, at 325–28 (reaching a similar conclusion).
125. See id. at 1082 (explaining that if the “computer’s owner, developer, and
user are different entities, such parties could negotiate” contract arrangements).
126. See generally Pamela Samuelson, Allocating Ownership Rights in
Computer-Generated Works, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1185 (1986).
127. See id. at 1203 (using the work for hire doctrine as support for a
computer’s user to own any copyrightable material arising from that computer).
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the copyright to whoever owns the copyright to the computer
program.”128 Building from this background, the following Part
begins the analysis of how to allocate AI patent rights to best
promote efficiency.
III. Coase Theorem
Economic theory mandates that a competitive marketplace
should seek economic efficiency—a situation wherein no party can
be made better without harming another.129 This target—known
as Pareto or allocative efficiency,130 but referenced herein simply
as “economic efficiency”—is likewise a goal of patent law.131 The
following Part discusses means by which this aim can be achieved
when allocating patent rights arising from AI discoveries.132 The
128. Andrew J. Wu, From Video Games to Artificial Intelligence: Assigning
Copyright Ownership to Works Generated by Increasingly Sophisticated Computer
Programs, 25 AIPLA Q.J. 131, 138 (1997).
129. See Sean Leibowitz, Note, State Insurance Rate Regulation: A Coasian
Perspective, 17 J.L. BUS. & ETHICS 107, 110 (2011) (providing background
information on accepted economic theory on economic efficiency); PAUL A.
SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 148 (18th ed., McGraw-Hill
Irwin 2005). A Pareto optimal situation “maximizes the surplus from
cooperation.” Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three
Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 833 n.8 (2003); see Mark M.
Bykowsky & William W. Sharkey, Using a Market to Obtain the Efficient
Allocation of Signal Interference Rights 13–14 (F.C.C., Working Paper No. 4,
2012), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-314439A1.pdf (examining
how the pareto optimal situation could be achieved in the auction context); Wis.
Elec. Power Co., 56 P.U.R.4th 509, n.40 (F.E.R.C. Sept. 19, 1983) (“Under optimal
economic efficiency, goods and services have been allocated in such a way that no
individual, for the time being at least, would choose to consume more or less of
any good or service. This state of things is also known as allocative efficiency or
Pareto optimality . . . .”).
130. See Willingham v. NovaStar Mortg., Inc., No. 04-CV-2391, 2006 WL
6676801, at *19 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 7, 2006) (explaining Pareto efficiency “occurs
when no individual can be made better off without making another worse off”);
Ellis & Hayden, supra note 29, at 241 (“When economists discuss efficiency, they
are typically referring to Pareto optimality, also known as Pareto efficiency or
allocative efficiency.”).
131. See Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual
Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2661 (1994) (indicating that the “goal of
intellectual property law is often described in allocational efficiency terms”).
132. Infra Part III.
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inquiry proceeds by treating these patents as a positive externality
and subjecting them to analysis under Coase Theorem and the host
of assumptions related thereto.133 The discussion concludes in Part
IV by making policy suggestions once these assumptions are
relaxed.
Externalities are side effects from one’s activities for which the
actor does not bear all consequences for or benefits from.134 Such
secondary effects represent a policy problem because they create
“a divergence between private marginal cost and social marginal
cost,”135 whereby producers make choices based on individual
economic factors without considering societal costs or benefits.
Restated, there are many instances where firms will—acting out
of perceived self-interest—choose to produce at a non-efficient
level.136 Coase Theorem, however, minimizes this concern.137 It
holds that—where transaction costs are zero and in the presence
of perfect information—resources will be distributed efficiently if
relevant property entitlements are clearly allocated regardless of
the initial allocation.138
133. Infra Part III.
134. See Wendy E. Wagner, What’s It All About, Cardozo?, 80 TEX. L. REV.
1577, 1586 (2002) (providing an explanation of externalities in the economics
context); Thomas A. Donovan, Litigation: An Antidote for Democracy, 54 FED.
LAW. 8, 9 (2007) (providing that “externalities can be positive or negative” and are
“the impacts that one person’s behavior has on others”); Jonathan R. Macey,
Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure, and Enron, 89 CORNELL L. REV.
394, 411–12 (2004) (discussing how externalities are “economic side effects” that
come from actions of various parties that affect a third party who is not
compensated or charged for the effects of the externality); Stefan J. Padfield, In
Search of a Higher Standard: Rethinking Fiduciary Duties of Directors of
Wholly-Owned Subsidiaries, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 79, 121 n.160 (2004)
(providing another definition of externalities).
135. John W. Mill, Note, Agricultural Chemical Contamination of
Groundwater: An Economic Analysis of Alternative Liability Rules, 1991 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1135, 1154 (1991) (citing ROBERT D. COOTER & THOMAS S. ULEN, LAW AND
ECONOMICS 45 (1988)).
136. Id.
137. See generally Coase, supra note 31.
138. See id. at 15 (explaining, given transaction costs are zero, that the initial
determination of property rights does not matter because the party who values
the right most will acquire it eventually); HIRSCH, supra note 26, at 19 (stating
under the Coase Theorem’s assumptions, resource allocation will be at the
Pareto-optimal level regardless of initial allocation); POSNER, supra note 31, at 10
(explaining how the Coase Theorem, including its assumptions, provides that the
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It does not matter whether an entitlement is given to a party
that is in a strong position to financially exploit that right or not,139
because interested parties can bargain between themselves, such
that whomever most values the entitlement will pay to obtain it.140
Any extrinsic costs or benefits will, via inter-firm transactions, find
their way to the manufacturer, who then bases decisions on the
total social benefit and produces products at an efficient level.141
A. Application of Coase Theorem
The below example depicts how—in the presence of no
transaction costs and perfect information—firms reach an efficient
state of affairs if relevant property entitlements are clearly
allocated.142 Farmer grows wheat and makes a $1,500 daily profit
from his operation until TrainCo installs a train track running just
“initial assignment of a property right will not affect the ultimate use of the
property”); Rule, supra note 30, at 195 (stating the Coase Theorem and applying
it to airspace rights in the context of drones); In re Stotler & Co., 144 B.R. 385,
393 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (“Coase’s theorem about contracting around the law’s
assignment of risk depends on the free flow of information.”); Coltman v. Comm’r,
980 F.2d 1134, 1136–37 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating Coase Theorem illustrates “so
long as the rule of law is known when parties act, the ultimate economic result is
the same no matter which way the law has resolved the issue”). Coase theorem
requires several assumptions, namely “(a) the parties whom the allocation affects
are informed about relevant economic variables; (b) wealth effects are absent; (c)
competitive markets exist; and (d) the cost of making transactions is zero.”
Schwartz, supra note 31, at 397–98; see Enrique Guerra-Pujol & Orlando I.
Martínez-García, Does the Prisoner’s Dilemma Refute the Coase Theorem?, 47 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 1289, 1300 (2014) (outlining the assumptions of the Coase
Theorem).
139. See Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, Valuing
Intellectual Property: An Experiment, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6 (2010) (stating that
the law presumes “parties will negotiate to transfer property rights” to those who
“might best exploit them”).
140. See Leibowitz, supra note 129, at 111 (explaining the efficient use of
resources under the Coase Theorem and its assumptions); Rule, supra note 30, at
195 (explaining that per the Coase Theorem, laws clearly allocating “initial
entitlements related to a resource promote allocative efficiency” by making it easy
for those who most value the resource to bargain over it).
141. See Coase, supra note 31 (explaining that if transactions are costless,
then the initial determination of rights can be changed if the changes “would lead
to an increase” in the value of what is produced).
142. See generally id.
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outside Farmer’s land.143 The trains emit sparks that ignite fires,
with each fire causing $200 in damage to the farm per train per
day.144 TrainCo’s profits are highest when running seven trains per
day, with profits diminishing beyond that point.145 The gains for
each party are shown below on a per daily train basis.146

143. See POSNER, supra note 31, at 10 (using a similar railroad and farmer
example to illustrate Coase’s Theorem).
144. See id. (providing a similar example to illustrate Coase’s Theorem).
145. Infra Table 1.
146. Infra Table 1.
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Table 1—Coase Theorem
Example, TrainCo & Farmer Surplus Schedule
Trains per
Day
0

TrainCo
Profit
$0

Farmer
Profit
$1500

Total
Surplus
$1500

1

$225

$1300

$1525

2

$450

$1100

$1550

3

$675

$900

$1575

4

$900

$700

$1600

5

$1075

$500

$1575

6

$1250

$300

$1550

7

$1350

$100

$1450

8

$1300

$0

$1300

From an economic efficiency perspective, the optimal situation
is where net surplus (the sum of all profits) is maximized
(regardless of what party receives the surplus).147 A maximized net
147. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF 90–91, 405 (1978) (explaining that “[c]onsumer welfare” is greatest when
resources are efficiently allocated and antitrust law aims to “preserve, improve,
and reinforce the powerful economic mechanisms that compel businesses to
respond to customers”); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE
LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 61–63 (2d ed. 1999) (explaining Chicago
School antitrust policy and stating that economic efficiency “should be the
exclusive goal of antitrust laws”); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 8 (1976) (arguing the economic theory that a monopoly
often leads to economic inefficiency “provides the only suitable basis for antitrust
policy”); Herbert Hovenkamp, Chicago and Its Alternatives, 1986 DUKE L.J. 1014,
1018 (1986) (“The maximization of economic surplus, which is the sum of
consumers’ surplus and producers’ surplus, is conventionally stated as the goal of
Chicago School antitrust policy.”); Russell S. Jutlah, Economic Theory and the
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surplus indicates that efficiency has been achieved.148 Thus, four
trains per day (reaching the maximum surplus of $1,600) is
optimal.149 The question thus becomes: how can government
incentivize TrainCo to run four trains per day?
In the absence of any regulation or law enforcement, both
parties will engage in attempts to change the law via litigation or
lobbying to their favor.150 TrainCo wants a law protecting it from
liability for damages to the farm, and Farmer prefers a law holding
TrainCo liable. In this situation, the parties will spend some
amount $X on lobbying, and total surplus equals the net profits
less $X. The expenditures on lobbying render it impossible to reach
economic efficacy (where total surplus is $1,600).
Coase Theorem predicts that this problem will be solved—and
economic efficiency obtained—if relevant property entitlements
(e.g., TrainCo’s ability to burn farm land liability free or Farmer’s
ability to sue for damages) are clearly allocated regardless of the
allocation.151 This surprising phenomenon is described below.

Environment, 12 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 10 (2001) (“[I]t is well settled within welfare
economics that a perfect competitive market maximizes social welfare, or achieves
a Pareto optimum, through a socially efficient allocation of resources.” (citing S.K.
NATH, A PERSPECTIVE OF WELFARE ECONOMICS 36 (1973))); see also Daniel A.
Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, Why (and How) Fairness Matters at the
IP/Antitrust Interface, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1817, 1818 (2003) (arguing that, beyond
maximizing net surplus, “the law should also encourage a fair division of the
economic surplus, at least as a secondary goal”).
148. See Kate Darling, Contracting About the Future: Copyright and New
Media, 10 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 485, 506 n.161 (2012) (discussing that the
pareto-optimal situation occurs when no one actor can be better off without
making another worse off); Juan Antonio Gaviria, An Experiment on the Role of
Penalty Clauses and the Level of Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract on the
Prevention of the Hold-Up Problem in Colombian Contract Law, 14 RICH. J.
GLOBAL L. & BUS. 1, 4 n.8 (2015) (explaining that “a surplus-maximizing
modification is Pareto-efficient”); Maurice E. Stucke, Morality and Antitrust, 2006
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 443, 446 n.4 (2006) (arguing economic efficiency is
maximized by both Pareto efficiency and technological efficiency).
149. Supra Table 1.
150. See Jules L. Coleman, Markets, Methods, Morals and the Law, 66 ALA. L.
REV. 169, 186 (2014) (providing examples of how to achieve the demanding
conditions under which the Coase Theorem functions best).
151. See POSNER, supra note 31, at 10 (providing an example of how the clear
initial allocation of property rights will lead to economic efficiency); see generally
Coase, supra note 31.
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If TrainCo is given the right to burn farmland without
liability, it will immediately act to maximize profits by running 7
trains a day—giving it a $1,350 profit and Farmer a $100 profit.
This knee-jerk business choice maximizes TrainCo’s immediate
profits, but does not reach economic efficiency (i.e., other courses
of action will result in a higher total surplus). Acting in his
self-interest, Farmer will propose a trade,152 whereby TrainCo
reduces its trains per day in exchange for a payment of $Y, such
that TrainCo’s profit plus $Y exceeds its maximum income without
trading ($1,350).153 Behaving to maximize income, TrainCo will
accept the proposal.154
Likewise, Farmer will engage in a trade whereby his income
less a payment of $Y exceeds the $100 he is currently making with
seven trains running.155 Wanting to maximize the total surplus
that he may share in, Farmer will propose a trade where TrainCo
runs four trains a day and receives a payment of $Y, which will be
between $451 and $599—guaranteeing that both parties make
more money with four trains running than seven.156 They are free
to negotiate the exact amount of $Y, but regardless of the amount
settled out, the parties will reach the efficient outcome of $1,600
total surplus.157
Next, assume the same situation, except the government
clearly allocates to Farmer the right to recover damages, such that
TrainCo makes payments to Farmer to cover any damages
sustained. This new information is described below.158 Note that

152. This trade could likewise be proposed by TrainCo with the same terms.
153. See POSNER, supra note 31, at 10 (providing a similar railroad and
farmland example of Coase’s Theorem).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. Farmer makes $700 with four trains running and he pays, at most,
$599—leaving him with at least $101, which is $1 more than he made with seven
trains running. TrainCo makes $900 with four trains running and receives, at
minimum, $451—totaling at least $1351, which is $1 more than he made with
seven trains running.
157. Id.; Farmer will make $700 – $Y. TrainCo will make $900 + $Y. The total
surplus is ($700 – $Y) + ($900 + $Y), which equals $1,600 for all values of Y.
158. Infra Table 2.
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the total surplus does not change; only the allocation of the surplus
is different.159
Table 2—Coase Theorem
Example, Surplus and Damages Schedule
Trains
per
Day

TrainCo
Profit

Farmer
Profit

Farmer’s
Damages

Total
Surplus

$0

TrainCo’s
Profit
Less
Damages
$0

0

$1500

$0

$1500

1

$225

$25

$1300

$200

$1525

2

$450

$50

$1100

$400

$1550

3

$675

$75

$900

$600

$1575

4

$900

$100

$700

$800

$1600

5

$1075

$75

$500

$1000

$1575

6

$1250

$50

$300

$1200

$1550

7

$1350

-$50

$100

$1400

$1450

8

$1300

-$200

$0

$1500

$1300

In this situation, the parties will again negotiate a settlement
whereby four trains run daily. Here, TrainCo will offer some
amount between $1 and $99 (plus damages) to Farmer to let it run
four trains per day. It will propose to run four trains per day
because that produces the greatest surplus that it may share. This
offer ensures that Farmer will receive $700 from crops, $800 in
damages, and an additional $1–$99, which in total exceeds
Farmer’s maximum profit absent trading ($1500).160 Likewise,
159.
160.

Compare infra Table 2, with supra Table 1.
Supra Table 2.
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TrainCo will enjoy $900 in income less $800 in damages and less
between $1 and $99 in payment to Farmer, leaving him with
between $1–$99, which is more profit than with zero trains
running ($0).161 Again, inter-firm transactions arrive at an efficient
outcome by allowing the parties to trade among themselves to
distribute property rights (i.e., the right run or stop trains) to the
parties that most value them.162
While the above example deals with a negative externality
(fires caused by the running of the train), Coase Theorem is
likewise
applicable
to
situations
involving
positive
externalities—external benefits created by market activity.163
Patenting AI technologies is properly treated as such
because—depending on how the government allocates the right to
obtain a patent—it potentially creates benefits for parties outside
the initial sale of software (e.g., software programmers, engineers,
product designers, downstream users or owners of the software,
etc.).164 Analyzing these rights as externalities is consistent with
prior literature on extrinsic benefits arising from information
creation and dissemination.165
161. Supra Table 2.
162. See generally Coase, supra note 31.
163. See Christopher J. Coyne & Peter T. Leeson, Who’s to Protect
Cyberspace?, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 473, 479 (2005) (discussing positive
externalities, such as a scientific research breakthrough); Brett M. Frischmann,
Speech, Spillovers, and the First Amendment, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 301, 305–06
(2008) (explaining positive externalities as benefits freely realized by someone
due to the actions of another).
164. See Paul E. McGreal, On the Cost Disease and Legal Education, 66
SYRACUSE L. REV. 631, 637 (2016) (discussing positive externalities); Coyne &
Leeson, supra note 163, at 479 (explaining how goods creating positive
externalities are under-supplied in the market because of the free-rider problem
of non-rivalrous goods).
165. See Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy
of “Rights Management”, 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 546 (1998) (discussing value
generated by “transactions in information” and stating that “mass media
products” that create positive externalities will be underproduced in an
unregulated market); C. Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience What It Wants, 58
OHIO ST. L.J. 311, 350–66 (1997) (discussing the positive externalities created by
mass media); Daniel J. Gifford, The Damaging Impact of the Eastman Kodak
Precedent Upon Product Competition: Antitrust Law in Need of Correction, 72
WASH. U. L.Q. 1507, 1507 n.1 (1994) (explaining the “diffusion of skills and
knowledge” occurs as positive externalities as new products and technology are
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In the presence of positive externalities, firms underproduce
goods for sale because they base manufacturing decisions only on
the value inherent in the good (e.g., the value of the inventing AI),
rather than considering the net social value created (e.g., the value
of the AI plus the value of the positive externality—the AI
patents).166 This failure to consider the value of positive
externalities when deciding output means software companies will
cease to manufacture even while the net public value of the good
still exceeds production costs.167 This is not an economically
efficient situation, as one party’s (the public’s) situation could be
improved (by being able to buy goods at or below their net utility
to the consumer), but the producer will cease production of goods
while there are still net marginal gains to be had on additional
units.168
For example, assume that the public will buy each unit of
inventing AI for $50 and that each unit sold will create $10 in
social welfare associated with AI patents.169 Assume that the per
unit cost of production for the software company increases with
each unit produced, such that the 100th unit produced costs $30.01
to make, the 101st costs $30.02, etc.170 If a software company is
unable to realize the $10 in value associated with the patent (e.g.,
if the patent rights are assigned to some other party), then it will
cease production where costs to manufacture another unit are $50.
This is inefficient. Production is ceasing where cost to produce
developed).
166. See Coyne & Leeson, supra note 163, at 479 (explaining goods creating
positive externalities are typically under supplied in the market).
167. See Jeffrey Standen, The Exclusionary Rule and Damages: An Economic
Comparison of Private Remedies for Unconstitutional Police Conduct, 2000 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 1443, 1447–48 (2000) (arguing deterrence of unconstitutional police
conduct is a positive externality that is likely to be underproduced if certain
conditions are met); Lawrence B. Solum, Public Legal Reason, 92 VA. L. REV. 1449,
1457–58 (2006).
168. See Coyne & Leeson, supra note 163, at 479 (describing that goods that
create positive externalities will be under supplied and lead the unregulated
market to be inefficient).
169. Assuming consistent consumer demand and patent value is unrealistic
but appropriate for this example.
170. Again, this is an unrealistic assumption as production costs usually
decrease with quantity produced but the assumption does not harm the example.
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($50) is still below the total social welfare produced ($60). The next
unit produced (assuming it costs $50.01 to make) would create a
social welfare gain of $9.99 (the $50 inherent value of the AI + the
$10 value of the patent – the $50.01 cost to produce).
This presents the question of to whom the Patent Office should
grant AI patents if it is attempting to maximize net surplus (i.e.,
social welfare) by allowing software companies to realize the full
value of their AI and thus produce at an economically efficient
level.171 Potential receipts of such rights include programmers,
software companies, AI users, downstream technical experts,
product engineers, etc.? Within the bounds of no transaction costs
and perfect information, Coase Theorem renders this question
superfluous.172 It does not matter to whom the patent rights are
allocated because the party that most values them will purchase
the patent and this value will trickle upstream to the software
company.173
Returning to our example, assume that the government
allocates AI patent rights to any downstream party that identifies
a novel invention made by AI—a situation discussed by Abbott.174
Likewise, assume companies that purchase AI and use it to invent
(“AI users”) value patent rights at their maximum level ($10), with
all other parties holding them in lesser esteem.175 In this situation,
the AI user will pay $50 to the software company to buy the AI.176
Assuming costless transactions, it will also be willing to pay up to
$10 to the downstream party for the patent rights.177 With perfect
information, the downstream party would have previously realized
171. See Gaviria, supra note 148, at 4 n.8 (maximizing net surplus is Pareto
optimal).
172. See generally Coase, supra note 31.
173. Id.
174. See Abbott, supra note 9, at 1098 (“For the purposes of this Article,
assuming that a computer cannot be an inventor, individuals who subsequently
‘discover’ computational inventions by mentally recognizing and appreciating
their significance would likely qualify as inventors.”). Abbott does not recommend
this allocation from a policy perspective, but it serves well as an example in this
instance.
175. See Coase, supra note 31 (stating that in the absence of transaction costs
the party that most values a property right will bargain to hold that right).
176. Id.
177. Id.
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it will not be able to secure the patent rights unless the software
company produces and sells the particular copy of the software
used in inventing the new technology.178 With this in mind, the
software company will demand a payment of up to $10 from the
downstream party (leaving that party with a small gain) or it will
not manufacture that copy of the software (and the downstream
party loses out on all income). Through this stream of costless
transactions, the full $60 in value ends up with the software
company, and it will be incentivized to produce at an efficient level
(up to the point where the cost of manufacture is $60).
This example is (admittedly) a bit unrealistic but so are
Coase’s assumptions of perfect information and costless
transactions. It does, however, depict how inter-firm transactions
ensure ownership of rights by the party that most values them and
ensures the full value of economic activity is secured by a
manufacturer. The manufacturer will then produce at an
economically efficient level where production cost equals social
welfare (net surplus) produced.179 These conclusions provide
insight into Coase’s holding, namely that, regardless of the initial
allocation of an entitlement, software companies will manufacture
inventing AI at an economically efficient level in the presence of
zero transaction costs and perfect information.180 These
assumptions do not, of course, hold true in reality.181 With that in
mind, this Article will later attempt to mimic this efficient state of
affairs in the presence of transaction costs, as in the real world.182
B. Using Coase Theorem to Construct Policy

178. See Ravid & Liu, supra note 121, at 2236 (explaining a patent owner can
exclude others who “independently invent” inventions similar to his or her
system).
179. See POSNER, supra note 31, at 10 (providing an example of how costless
transactions will allow a right to be put the most productive use regardless of its
initial assignment).
180. See Coase, supra note 31, at 8 (arguing the most efficient outcome will
occur if the initial determination of rights is clear and transactions are costless).
181. See id. at 15 (acknowledging the assumptions that transactions are
costless and perfect information are unrealistic).
182. Infra Part III.B.
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Coase recognized his assumptions do not represent the real
world and pragmatism must be considered when constructing
policy.183 His theorem thus proves to be a useful tool to begin
analysis of entitlement allocation.184 Transaction costs do exist and
must be contemplated when implementing new policy.185
Legislators should therefore attempt to effectuate a system in
reality that most closely mimics an idealized Coasean market186 to
bring about an efficient state of affairs.187
Commenters suggest two means by which Coase’s insights can
be implemented in the real world188—both of which are intended to
minimize expenditures arising from inter-firm trading.189 High
transaction costs detract from efficient allocation of resources, and
in the worst case scenario, completely impede inter-firm trading.190
183. See Gareth Porter, Pollution Standards and Trade: The “Environmental
Assimilative Capacity” Argument, 4 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 49, 63 (1998)
(acknowledging that in reality transaction costs do exist).
184. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1096
(1972) (stating Coase’s Theorem and its assumption of no transaction costs is a
good starting point for an entitlement allocation analysis).
185. See Porter, supra note 183, at 63 (discussing that transaction costs in the
real world must be taken into account to provide effective policy).
186. See HIRSCH, supra note 26, at 20 (explaining if transactions costs are not
zero, efficiency is assisted if the property right is initially “assigned to the party
who would normally buy it”); Coleman, supra note 150, at 186 (explaining how in
many situations the costs of determining who “our bargaining partners are can
be too high for bargaining to work”); Michael I. Swygert & Katherine Earle Yanes,
A Unified Theory of Justice: The Integration of Fairness into Efficiency, 73 WASH.
L. REV. 249, 288 (1998) (stating users of the Coase Theorem must remember that
the “Coasean world” differs from the real world).
187. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 184, at 1096–97 (explaining that
when there are transaction costs, society can assist in allocating entitlements to
achieve efficiency).
188. See Seth D. Harris, Coase’s Paradox and the Inefficiency of Permanent
Strike Replacements, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1185, 1193–94 (2002) (stating that when
Coase’s assumptions are relaxed, legal rules can be used to further economic
efficiency by designing them to minimize transactions or legal rules can impose a
solution that “approximates the efficient agreement”).
189. See Kelly, supra note 34, at 864 (stating that policymakers can minimize
transaction costs “by lowering the costs of borrowing or by allocating entitlements
efficiently so that bargaining is unnecessary”).
190. See Pierre Schlag, An Appreciative Comment on Coase’s The Problem of
Social Cost: A View from the Left, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 919, 923 (1986) (explaining
how in reality transactions costs could be so high that the allocation of
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Specifically, where gains from trade are outweighed by transaction
costs, parties have no incentive to bargain,191 and thus, may fail to
reach the efficient allocation of property predicted by Coase. At
minimum, transaction costs deduct from economic surplus.192
The first manner to approximate a Coasean property
allocation is to assign entitlements to the party that most values
them.193 This type of rule mimics Coase Theorem by avoiding
transaction costs all together; there is no need to engage in trades
to place an entitlement in the hands of a party that maximally
values it if that party holds the initial assignment.194 In the
aggregate, this policy will—consistent with Coase Theorem—
maximize net surplus and achieve economic efficiency.195
Similarly, entitlements can be distributed to minimize
transaction costs.196 In such a situation, efficient allocation (as
predicted by Coase) is feasible where the transaction cost remains
below the potential gains from trade.197 As a corollary, it is
preferable to minimize the number of parties involved in a transfer
because costs increase on a per party basis.198 Of course, the goal
of minimizing transaction costs is furthered by following the first
policy recommendation—simply allocating rights to the party that
most values them (eliminating the need for any transaction and

entitlements will not change after the initial allocation).
191. See Kelly, supra note 34, at 864 (describing how transaction costs can
prevent parties from reaching the most efficient outcome for all).
192. Id.
193. See Hovenkamp, supra note 26, at 638 (describing that policymakers
could assign the “initial allocation to the highest value user” so trading of the
entitlement is not needed).
194. See HIRSCH, supra note 26, at 20 (stating that when transaction costs are
high, efficiency is advanced if the party who would buy the property right is
initially assigned that right).
195. Id.
196. See Kelly, supra note 34, at 864 (using legal rules to minimize
transaction costs will move the market towards the most efficient point).
197. See Harris, supra note 188, at 1193–94 (explaining the two ways legal
rules can improve economic efficiency).
198. See Porter, supra note 183, at 63 (acknowledging that relaxing Coase’s
zero transaction costs assumption makes the bargaining approach impractical for
large groups).
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associated cost).199 The following Part looks to how this insight can
be implemented into policy.
IV. Coasean Analysis of Patent Ownership
Coasean assignment of property entitlements is a function of
the parties’ respective valuations of the good, transaction costs,
and the number of firms involved in the matter.200 As discussed
above, rights should be allocated to whomever most values them
(which minimizes transaction costs).201 The below presents a
multi-step analysis towards efficient allocation of patent rights for
AI inventions.202
This Part begins by discussing various candidates to whom AI
patent rights might be assigned. Benefits arising therefrom are
evaluated, and each benefit is analyzed to determine whether—
and to what quantum—it accrues to a respective candidate for
patent ownership.203 From this, it is possible to determine which
party in the AI invention lifecycle most values the ability to secure
AI patents.
Building from this information, the Article concludes by
making Coasean policy suggestions pertaining to the assignment
of ownership rights for AI patents.204 The analysis determines
that—to maximize social welfare—these rights should be allotted
to AI users who utilize the software for invention because they hold
these patents in greatest value. This assignment minimizes
transaction costs.205 In turn, such a policy ensures substantial
199. See HIRSCH, supra note 26, at 20 (making the argument that efficiency is
improved if property rights are initially assigned to the party who would
ultimately buy the right).
200. See Porter, supra note 183, at 62–63 (stating a Coasean analysis is based
on willingness to bargain, transaction costs, and becomes impractical as the
number of parties increases).
201. See Kelly, supra note 34, at 864 (stating that if property rights are
initially allocated to the party who would eventually buy them then efficiency is
improved).
202. Infra subparts IV.A–D.
203. Infra subparts IV.A–C.
204. Infra Part V.
205. See Kelly, supra note 34, at 865 (explaining how assigning property
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internalization of positive externalities and economic efficiency
(i.e., maximum social welfare).206
A. Types of Patent Value
Patent ownership creates value in a variety of manners.207
Depending on the situation, these benefits may (or may not) accrue
themselves to particular owners.208 Patents have historically been
seen as a manner for a firm to insulate itself from competition and
charge supra-competitive prices.209 While this remains a focus of
patent strategy, a variety of additional benefits have presented
themselves as the field has matured.210 These are discussed below.
Owning a patent serves a signaling function in the
entrepreneurial financing market.211 Signals allow a party to incur
some cost to convey information about itself to outside firms.212
Securing a patent transmits a positive message about the state of

rights initially to those who value the right most minimizes transaction costs).
206. See Coyne & Leeson, supra note 163, at 479 (demonstrating how positive
externalities that are not internalized by firms creating them lead to an inefficient
market).
207. See David H. Hsu & Rosemarie H. Ziedonis, Resources as Dual Sources
of Advantage: Implications for Valuing Entrepreneurial-Firm Patents, 34
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 761, 762 (2013) (arguing that patents provide an advantage
as a signaling devices and that patents confer an even greater advantage in
“strategic factor markets”); Vincent J. Roth, Will FDA Data Exclusivity Make
Biologic Patents Passé?, 29 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 249, 273
(2013) (outlining the various ways patents create value).
208. See Hsu & Ziedonis, supra note 207, at 766 (arguing the signaling
function of patents is “particularly important for new ventures”).
209. See Andrew Chin, Teaching Patents as Real Options, 95 N.C. L. REV.
1433, 1446 (2017) (explaining that a patent owner likely will try to charge high
prices during the patent grant period to obtain higher profits).
210. See Knut Blind et al., Motives to Patent: Empirical Evidence from
Germany, 35 RES. POL’Y 655, 655 (2006) (arguing the value of patents has
increased over time).
211. See Hsu & Ziedonis, supra note 207, at 764 (discussing how the
“informational imperfections” in entrepreneurial markets make patent signaling
effects valuable).
212. See Clark D. Asay, The Informational Value of Patents, 31 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 259, 277 (2016) (discussing how a firm’s patent can translate into an
indication of a firm’s positive value in the marketplace).
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the firm’s research and development,213 which may lead to
successfully obtaining outside investment.214
Likewise, patents serve two distinct blocking functions,
whereby a patentee limits the scope of a rival’s strategic
behavior.215 Offensive blocking occurs when a party secures a
patent not with the hopes of utilizing the technology but rather to
preclude competitors from implementing the claimed inventions to
compete with the patentee’s own offerings.216 Defensive blocking
prevents other firms from patenting relevant technologies and
then inhibiting a firm’s capacity to manufacture goods.217 In the
213. See Paul J. Heald, A Transaction Costs Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIO
ST. L.J. 473, 478 (2005) (discussing that patents can be a signal that a firm has a
high research and development capacity (citing Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69
U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 627–28 (2002))).
214. See Dov Solomon & Miriam Bitton, Intellectual Property Securitization,
33 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 125, 159 (2015) (arguing that one reason companies
obtain patents is to secure outside investment); Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High
Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley
Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1306 (2009) (discussing how “VC
investors rely on patents in their investment decisions”); Kevin G. Rivette, Henry
R. Nothhaft & David Kline, Discovering New Value in Intellectual Property, 78
HARV. BUS. REV. 54, 60 (2000) (stating that companies can “repackage” their
patents to attract new investors); Hsu & Ziedonis, supra note 207, at 774
[W]e find that (1) patents are more influential for founders
lacking prior entrepreneurial success in securing initial funds
from prominent VCs; (2) patents induce steeper valuation
adjustments in earlier rounds of VC financing; and
(3) conditioned on an IPO exit, patents play a more influential
role in bridging information gaps with public investors when
start-ups lack prominent VC investors.
215. See Blind et al., supra note 210, at 657 (explaining offensive blocking and
defensive blocking patents); T. Randolph Beard et al., Quantifying the Cost of
Substandard Patents: Some Preliminary Evidence, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 240, 245
(2010) (arguing a “loose” patent system leads to a misallocation of resources,
including more defensive patents and blocking patents); Steven C. Carlson,
Patent Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 359, 367 (1999)
(“Patentees, too, may deliberately acquire blocking positions as a strategic move
to frustrate the patenting programs of competitors.” (citations omitted)).
216. See Blind et al., supra note 210, at 657 (providing that offensive blocking
patents are patents obtained to prevent other firms in the same or a closely
related field from using the technical inventions of the firm holding the patent).
217. See Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex
Patent Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J.
297, 320–21 (2010) (identifying a defensive strategy of “obtaining a large portfolio
of patents . . . to prevent competitors from blocking its new products”).
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defensive aspect, the patentee is acting only to ensure that it has
the right to use strategically relevant technologies.218
Patents
likewise
serve
a
negotiation-facilitating
function—both before and during litigation.219 Parties commonly
facilitate manufacture by cross-licensing relevant portfolios to
each other, such that both can operate without the threat of
infringement litigation.220 Absent a patent portfolio to
cross-license, a manufacturer may incur licensing fees or risk
infringement litigation.221 Likewise, should a patentee be sued for
patent infringement, it has the ability to counter-claim for
infringement of its own patents, creating incentives for the
plaintiff to settle on reasonable terms or end the suit via
cross-license.222
Lastly, patents may create an income stream independent of
product manufacture.223 This value is obtained via litigation or
licensing efforts,224 whereby firms sell the right to use the patented
218. See id. at 321 (“In defensive contexts, patents are used to ward off suits,
as well as to gain access to technology and to further technological adoption.”).
219. See Joshua Chao, Tax Incentives for Innovation in a Modern IP
Ecosystem, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 753, 761 (2013) (explaining that
companies strategically use cross licensing agreements to resolve potential or
actual legal disputes).
220. See id. at 760–61 (describing the process of cross licensure as an option
for companies to prevent litigation in manufacturing situations involving
semiconductor production); see also Rivette, Nothhaft & Kline, supra note 214, at
57 (“[Dell] used its patents as the collateral for a $16 billion cross-licensing deal
with IBM that provides it with lower cost components. Dell is freed from having
to pay IBM tens of millions of dollars in royalties, which makes Dell more price
competitive.”).
221. See Robert E. Thomas, Debugging Software Patents: Increasing
Innovation and Reducing Uncertainty in the Judicial Reform of Software Patent
Law, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 191, 210 (2008) (stating small
companies without patents may either negotiate license fees without leverage or
risk litigation).
222. Cf. Aria Soroudi, Comment, Defeating Trolls: The Impact of Octane and
Highmark on Patent Trolls, 35 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 319, 323–24 (2015) (stating
that parties cannot counter-claim or use patent agreements against patent
trolls—a common settlement method in patent disputes—because patent trolls do
not use patented inventions).
223. See Rivette, Nothhaft & Kline, supra note 214, at 55–56 (explaining how
a former Chief Financial Officer at IBM viewed patent licensing royalties as
“largely free cash flow” independent of production).
224. See id. at 56 (citing both licensing and patent infringement suits as two
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invention.225 This strategy may mimic the business model adopted
by patent assertion entities (also known as patent trolls).226
B. Patent Valuation as a Function of Market Participation
This subpart describes why, among the above discussed
sources of patent value, the majority are maximized if the owner
participates in a market relating to the patented technology. It
follows that patents are most valuable to market participants, and
as presented below, AI users (parties using the software to invent)
are most likely to be marketplace participants. Thus, AI users will,
in all probability, maximally value the patents arising therefrom.
The fact that other parties can lucratively engage in patent
monetization (e.g., patent licensing and litigation) does not
dissuade this conclusion.
The traditionally recognized benefit of a patent—market
exclusivity227—is enjoyable only by parties that participate in the
relevant market.228 Elimination of competition is valueless if a
patentee does not participate in relevant commerce, and thus, is
unable to enjoy benefits such as supracompetitive pricing229 and
advantages in manufacturing efficiency.230 Market participants
values of patents).
225. See id. at 57 (describing a licensing agreement between Dell and IBM
whereby Dell saved money using licensing agreements as a way to avoid paying
royalties to IBM to use IBM’s patented components).
226. See Ted Sichelman, The Vonage Trilogy: A Case Study in “Patent
Bullying”, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 543, 547–58 (2014) (describing the patent troll
goals as earning revenue from patent litigation and licensing).
227. See Chin, supra note 209, at 1436 (stating that the value the patent
derives is from the right to exclude others from otherwise profiting off of the
invention).
228. See Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the
Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2128 (2013) (contrasting the non-practicing
entity—entity not participating in the market—with the traditional strategies of
practicing entities, including the competitive benefits against other market
participants).
229. See Chin, supra note 209, at 1446 (stating that firms may only obtain
supracompetitive profits when the patents cover all close substitutes, implying
that a company would only be able to reap these supracompetitive profits if they
involved themselves in the same marketplace as competitors).
230. See Ofer Tur-Sinai, The Endowment Effect in IP Transactions: The Case
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will thus most value patent ownership with regard to market
exclusivity.
The conclusion is consistent for signaling in the venture
capital market and using patents for blocking purposes. Parties
that are not participating in the market—and have no intent to do
so in the future—need not raise capital for endeavors in that field,
and positive signals regarding the firm’s research are essentially
valueless.
Similarly,
blocking
patents—which
proscribe
competitors’ business options—are without worth if a party is not
a market participant and has no competitors.231
With regard to the use as negotiation tools, patents are (again)
most valuable to firms participating in commerce.232 Companies
not in the market cannot face the threat of patent infringement
litigation and cannot have their planned business endeavors
limited by competitors’ patent rights.233 Absent commercial
activity, a company will not engage in infringing activities or plan
future market activities.234 Without these threats, firms have no
need to engage in cross-licensing to terminate potential litigation
or avoid licensing costs.235 Accordingly, patents create no value via
facilitating negotiations for parties that do not engage in relevant
markets.
The final source of patent value—monetization via licensing
and litigation236—is the sole patent benefit that is not
Against Debiasing, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 117, 135 n.102 (2011)
(describing the situation in which a patent owner foregoes licensing technology
which increased the patent owner’s profitability to gain a “significant competitive
advantage”).
231. See Chien, supra note 217, at 320–21 (describing the blocking benefits of
patents and how companies go about exploiting these benefits).
232. See Chao, supra note 219, at 761 (identifying the negotiation benefits of
licensing agreements to resolve potential litigation).
233. See Soroudi, supra note 222, at 323–24 (highlighting the issue of
counter-suing non-practicing entities due to their lack of participation in the
market through the production of patented inventions).
234. Cf. id. (characterizing the issues associated with non-practicing entities
not participating in the market through use of patented inventions).
235. See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 228, at 2129–30 (comparing the
non-practicing entity goal of monetizing profit with the practicing entity
settlement with cross-licensing with other practicing entities).
236. See Brian J. Love & James Yoon, Predictably Expensive: A Critical Look
at Patent Litigation in the Eastern District of Texas, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 3
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disproportionately valuable to market participants.237 Essentially
any patentee can attempt to monetize its patents by selling the
rights to practice the technology; the business model only requires
patent ownership and startup funds.238 This type of patent value
is thus equivalent for all parties.239 Of course, market participants
may have the technical knowledge necessary for licensing, which
creates efficiencies and increases a patent’s licensing value for
market participants.240
In summary, all relevant benefits arising from patent
ownership are most valuable when the patentee participates in the
relevant marketplace.241 It is true that any owner can transfer
their patent to a market participant,242 but that is not equivalent
to assigning the initial entitlement to the party that most values
it. This conclusion is warranted in light of the transaction costs
associated with patent assignment (i.e., expenditures associated
with selling the patent to a market participant who most values
the patent), which decrease the value of the patent.243
(2017) (listing the sole purpose of patent troll companies as “monetizing patent
rights through litigation”).
237. See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 228, at 2128–29 (identifying the
similarities of non-practicing entities and practicing entities in the way they use
patent litigation).
238. See Matthew Fawcett & Jeremiah Chan, March of the Trolls: Footsteps
Getting Louder, 13 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 1, 12 (2008) (listing the only real
expense as buying patents and hiring lawyers and consultants on a contingency
basis).
239. See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 228, at 2131–32 (providing two
hypothetical examples of non-practicing entities and practicing entities engaging
in licensing and litigation and arriving at the same revenue).
240. Cf. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., SUCCESSFUL TECHNOLOGY
LICENSING
6
(2015),
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/licensing/903/
wipo_pub_903.pdf (arguing that technical knowledge is required to maximize the
value on both sides of a licensing negotiation).
241. Supra notes 231–235 and accompanying text.
242. See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 228, at 2122 (stating that patents
may be bought and sold, and thus the party holding the patent at the time of the
action can enforce the patent).
243. For instance, assume a patent is worth $100 to a market participant, but
the right to obtain the patent was assigned to a non-participant. A market
participant may pay $100 for the patent, but the non-participant seller will only
receive $99 after it pays $1 in transaction costs (e.g., legal fees). Thus, the patent
is worth $100 to a market participant, but only $99 to a non-participant.
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C. Assignment of Patent Rights

The literature on real world application of Coase Theorem
holds that—in order to maximize economic efficiency—property
entitlements should be allocated to the party that most values
them.244 As discussed in the above subsection, market participants
will maximally value AI patent rights.245 There is thus only one
issue left towards determining what party should be entitled to AI
patents to maximize economic efficiency: who in the AI invention
timeline has the highest probably of engaging in commerce
associated with AI-produced invention? As discussed below, AI
users (those using the software to invent) are most likely market
participants, and thus, should be entitled to receive AI patents.246
There are a host of parties involved in AI innovation that
might be considered for patent ownership.247 The software’s
lifecycle begins with researchers and programmers (collectively
programmers) who design and write the AI package.248 “Software
companies” make and distribute the software available for
purchase or license.249 These firms may employ programmers.250
The AI is subsequently purchased or licensed by a firm for use in
creating AI inventions in a particular field (hereinafter AI users),
and the results are analyzed for market relevance and
244. See Kelly, supra note 34, at 864 (stating that if property rights are
initially allocated to the party who would eventually buy them, efficiency is
improved).
245. Supra notes 231–235 and accompanying text.
246. Infra notes 268–269 and accompanying text.
247. See Abbott, supra note 9, at 1114 (identifying various potential entities
who would have a vested interest in patent ownership); see also Samuelson, supra
note 126, at 1190 (discussing the issue from the copyright perspective).
248. See PLOTKIN, supra note 70, at 5–6 (explaining the process of
programmers creating software).
249. See Bronwyn Fryer, High Tech the Old-Fashioned Way: An Interview
with Tom Siebel of Siebel Systems, HARV. BUS. REV. (March 2001),
https://hbr.org/2001/03/tom-siebel-of-siebel-systems-high-tech-the-old-fashionedway (last visited Dec. 16, 2018) (identifying a standard practice among competitor
software companies of engineering and selling software products) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
250. See James Martin & Carma McClure, Buying Software off the Rack:
Packages Can Be the Solution to the Software Shortage, 61 HARV. BUS. REV. 32, 33
(1983) (discussing the employment of programmers in “software houses”).
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patentability by technically trained “reviewers.”251 These experts
are likely employees of AI users.252 Any number of additional
downstream parties may come into contact with the AI-produced
inventions, including product engineers, technical experts, and
others exposed to the information.253 The following analysis of
these parties determines that AI users are most likely to
participate in the market relevant to their AI inventions, and thus,
should be allocated relevant patent rights to maximize social
welfare.
Software companies and programmers in the AI innovation
realm are unlikely to be engaged in commerce specific to any
particular area of invention beyond the creation of AI.254 For
instance, IBM (a software company) and its employees (including
programmers) labored to create and distribute one of the better
known pieces of AI—called “Watson”255—which is used in a variety

251. Cf. Donal O’Connell, How to Best Run a Patent Review Board, IPEG
(2014), https://www.ipeg.com/how-to-best-run-a-patent-review-board/ (last visited
Dec. 4, 2018) (discussing company use of patent review processes to determine
patentability of company creations) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
252. See id. (discussing the employment of patent reviewers directly by the
companies creating the potentially patentable material).
253. See supra note 219 and accompanying text (discussing the usefulness of
cross-licensing opportunities for companies focusing in technology production
based on the frequency of working with patented material created by other
entities).
254. See Peter S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law’s Digital Future, 46
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63, 74 (2002–2003) (discussing the highly specialized nature
of programming at software companies).
255. See Libby Plummer, Why Isn’t IBM’s Watson Supercomputer Making
Money?, WIRED (July 21, 2017), http://www.wired.co.uk/article/ibm-watsonsupercomputer-profit (last visited Dec. 4, 2018) (describing IBM’s Watson
supercomputer) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also
Abbott, supra note 9, at 1089 (describing IBM’s goals with developing the Watson
supercomputer).
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of fields including finance,256 law,257 and medicine.258 Despite being
utilized in these areas, however, IBM has yet to open a law office
or hospital.259 Software companies and programmers tend to
remain within their area of expertise, as opposed to participating
in the market for every field in which their AI might be
employed.260
In contrast, AI users (e.g., product manufacturers) are likely
to participate in commerce relevant to the field of their AI
innovations. These parties are disproportionately expected to
purchase or license inventing software for the specific purpose of
gaining a marketplace advantage though innovation.261 Examples
of this phenomenon include General Electric (jet engines)262 and
Hitachi (high-speed trains).263
256. See Jen Doll, ‘Jeopardy!’ Win Behind Him, Watson Seeks Billions on Wall
Street,
ATLANTIC
(Mar.
6,
2012),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/03/jeopardy-win-behind-himwatson-seeks-billions-wall-street/330903/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2018) (listing
finance as an area IBM’s Watson is now being used) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
257. See Paul Lippe, What We Know and Need to Know About Watson, Esq.,
67 S.C. L. REV. 419, 427 (2016) (stating that IBM has started partnering with
companies in numerous fields including law).
258. See Zina Moukheiber, Mayo Clinic Turns to IBM’s Watson to Match
Cancer Patients with Clinical Trials, FORBES (Sept. 8, 2014, 8:00 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/zinamoukheiber/2014/09/08/mayo-clinic-turns-toibms-watson-to-match-cancer-patients-with-clinical-trials/ (last visited Dec. 4,
2018) (explaining how clinicians are using IBM’s Watson in the medical field for
things such as selecting patients for clinical trials) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
259. See
generally
IBM
Services,
IBM,
https://www.ibm.com/services?lnk=hpmse_ts&lnk2=learn (last visited Dec. 4,
2018) (listing the services IBM does engage in excluding any reference to law
offices or hospitals) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
260. See Menell, supra note 254, at 74 (discussing the highly specialized
nature of programming).
261. See Michael A. Gollin, Using Intellectual Property to Improve
Environmental Protection, 4 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 193, 197 (1991) (“[A]s with all
innovation, an overarching goal is to gain a competitive advantage in the
marketplace.”).
262. See Kurzweil, supra note 68, at 114 (discussing the use of genetic
algorithms in the design of jet engines).
263. See PLOTKIN, supra note 70, at 60 (discussing the use of genetic
algorithms to evolve the design of Hitachi trains to optimize aerodynamic
performance).
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There are a variety of individuals employed by software
owners, including reviewers who evaluate AI inventions for
market value or patentability and engineers who attempt to
implement the idea in new inventions.264 While these downstream
parties may have technical expertise germane to the relevant
inventions—some commenters even argue these individuals may
be “inventors” under current patent law265—they are likely to be
employed by market participants rather than actually
manufacturing or providing products or services.266 As such, the
parties are unlikely to directly participate in relevant commerce.267
Premised upon the above, it is most likely that AI users (firms
using AI to create inventions for use in commerce) will be market
participants. Such parties are expected, as discussed previously in
Part IV.B, to most value AI patents. Accordingly—consistent with
the idea that entitlements should be allocated to the party that
most values them to mimic an idealized Coasean market268—AI
users should be afforded the opportunity to patent inventions
created by AI to achieve economic efficiency.269
264. See supra note 251 and accompanying text (discussing company use of
patent review processes to determine patentability of company creations).
265. See Abbott, supra note 9, at 1098 (arguing that the person downstream
who receives the computational inventions and recognizes their significance could
qualify as the person who discovers the invention).
266. See supra notes 254–260 and accompanying text (discussing the
tendency of software companies to employ programmers who engage specifically
in the specialized market producing software to be used by production and service
industries); see also Brad Smith, Intuit’s CEO on Building A Design-Driven
Company, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/01/intuits-ceo-onbuilding-a-design-driven-company (last visited Dec. 4, 2018) (discussing Intuit’s
situation in the market of only working with software and providing a product to
be implemented in other business models) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
267. See supra notes 231–235 and accompanying text (demonstrating that the
parties not participating in the actual manufacturing process are more likely to
not engage directly in the relevant market).
268. See Kelly, supra note 34, at 864 (stating that if property rights are
initially allocated to the party who would eventually buy them, efficiency is
improved).
269. It is likewise notable that, beyond merely allocating these patent rights
to parties that will most value them, allocating the rights in this manner likewise
incentivizes the market participants to engage in further inventive activity. This
leads to a relative increase in patentable inventions, and thus, value created via
patents.
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D. Considerations on Not Allocating Patent Rights to Software
Companies
The above analysis establishes that patent rights should be
allocated to AI users. Several related points, however, warrant
discussion in this final substantive part. Software companies
may—in response to the grant of patent rights to AI
users—attempt to circumvent this allocation by internalizing the
invention process.270 In such a situation, the software company
becomes an AI user and may secure related patents.271 Such
artifice will not, however, work for reasons discussed below.272
Further, some commenters disagree with the allocation of
patent rights proposed herein, arguing that software companies
should be entitled to AI patents (or AI copyrights).273 Beyond
failing to allocate rights to those that most value them, such a
policy creates inefficiencies by promoting patent troll activity274
and creating substantial costs associated with the policing of
relevant contracts.275 These points are discussed in the following
subsections.
1. Internalization of Invention by Software Firms

270. Infra notes 286–287 and accompanying text.
271. Infra notes 293–294 and accompanying text.
272. Infra notes 300–301 and accompanying text.
273. See, e.g., Abbott, supra note 9, at 1114–15 (“Ownership rights to
computational inventions should vest in a computer’s owner because it would be
most consistent with the way personal property . . . is treated in the United States
and it would most incentivize computational invention.”); Wu, supra note 128, at
138 (“[W]here neither the programmer nor the user meet the requirements of
authorship to a copyrightable work, the court should assign the copyright to
whoever owns the copyright to the computer program.”).
274. See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE
Disputes, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 387, 423 (2014) (arguing that assigning patents to
non-practicing entities increases litigation and costs for market participants).
275. See Michael A. Carrier, Two Puzzles Resolved: Of the Schumpeter-Arrow
Stalemate and Pharmaceutical Innovation Markets, 93 IOWA L. REV. 393, 406 n.59
(2008) (“Monitoring costs, which include policing costs of enforcing contracts,
reduce the value of property rights.” (citing John Lunn, The Roles of Property
Rights and Market Power in Appropriating Innovative Output, 14 J. LEGAL STUD.
423, 425 (1985))).
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The proposed allocation of patent rights to AI users raises the
issue of how software companies will react. An expected response
is to capture the value of these patents by internalizing AI
invention, such that software companies undertake the actions of
an AI user and become a potential patentee for inventions arising
therefrom. Should this artifice succeed, relevant property rights
(patents) would not be allocated to market participants and
economic efficiency would not be achieved.276 On this issue, a
second work by Coase—The Nature of the Firm—describes why
such internalization is unlikely.277
In his study, Coase addressed the question of “why is not all
production organized in a single large firm?”278 His answer was
that economic activities are internalized where transaction costs
associated with external contracts exceed the savings created by
allowing an external firm to undertake a particular activity.279 An
example is a company considering internalizing an economic
activity which it can do it for $50 but which provides it with $60 of
value. It will internalize the activity (and secure a $10 gain) unless
it can be outsourced to obtain a larger aggregate benefit. With this
in mind, even if an outside entity will undertake the same activity
for $45, the company will internalize the job if the cost of
contracting with the external party is $5.01 or more. Deducting the
cost of outsourcing ($45) and transaction costs (at least $5.01) from
the activity’s value ($60) leaves the firm in a worse position if it
outsources (securing at most a $9.99 gain, instead of $10 from
doing the act in house). The choice to internalize (or not) is thus a
function of the benefit from an activity, costs of outsourcing, and
costs of internalizing the act. As shown below, benefits associated
with AI invention by software companies are substantially
276. See supra Parts IV.C–D (discussing the economic efficiency of giving
patents to market participants).
277. See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 395
(1937) (arguing that firms will externalize when the costs of internalization are
greater than the costs of externalization).
278. Id. at 394.
279. See id. at 395 (“[A] firm will tend to expand until the costs of organizing
an extra transaction within the firm become equal to the costs of carrying out the
same transaction by means of an exchange on the open market or the costs of
organizing in another firm.”).
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undermined by new information costs and is not expected to be
financially viable.
At first blush, it appears that software companies are likely to
internalize the AI inventive process. They have the know-how to
efficiently operate their software, are aware of the industries
interested in AI invention (via past sales), and will enjoy the value
of AI patents to which they would be entitled.280 These
considerations favor a determination that software firms will
internalize AI invention in a fiscally efficient manner (e.g., such
that it costs less to internalize the activity relative to letting others
do so).281 This conclusion, however, ignores substantial
information costs associated with producing relevant inventions
and associated patents.
To utilize AI to create valuable inventions (which lead to
valuable patents), a party must maintain significant
organizational knowledge.282 Firms in any particular field have
information relevant to identifying subject areas where invention
will prove valuable as that market evolves, as there is no need to
invent products with no future market value.283 An entity must
likewise have the technical expertise necessary to identify a
valuable invention produced by AI; invention cannot lead to patent
value if no one recognizes which inventions are important.284
Lastly, only a party actively participating in the market can assess
its particular inventive needs relative to its private business plans;

280. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the benefits associated with patent
ownership by software companies).
281. See Coase, supra note 277 (hypothesizing that firms will internalize costs
until it is less expensive for the firm to externalize the cost or start another firm).
282. See Morten T. Hansen et al., What’s Your Strategy for Managing
Knowledge?, 77 HARV. BUS. REV. 106, 106–07 (1999) (discussing how firms
maintain organizational knowledge relevant to their field of expertise).
283. See Marco Verweij, Why Is the River Rhine Cleaner Than the Great Lakes
(Despite Looser Regulation)?, 34 L. & SOC’Y REV. 1007, 1048 (2000) (“Firms have
detailed knowledge of their cost structure, and they are well positioned to develop
new technologies and to find efficient, practical solutions to [their] problems.”).
284. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Patents, Presumptions, and Public Notice, 86
IND. L.J. 779, 781 (2011) (discussing the importance of technical knowledge to
patenting activities).
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this information is not available to outside firms and thus cannot
be broadly used to invent the “right” new technologies.285
These considerations leave software companies with an
unenviable choice. They can either pay significant sums to hire
technical experts and obtain necessary information from firms in
the field, or they can produce inventions (and thus patents) of little
value due to a want of needed information.286 In these situations,
the cost to internalize invention will either rise significantly or the
value from AI patents will fall precipitously, respectively. In
neither instance can internalization of AI invention be expected to
prove a net benefit, except in rare circumstances.287 Software
companies cannot, therefore, be expected to internalize AI
invention on a significant scale.
2. Patent Troll Activity
Beyond the prior discussion of benefits arising from patent
ownership, a relevant secondary consideration is the social cost
that may arise from AI patents. More specifically, it is prudent to
determine how these patents might be monetized and the societal
impact arising therefrom. This concern is germane to a primary
issue in modern patent scholarship, namely attempts to discourage
the patent assertion entity (also referred to as “patent troll”)
business model.288 The below discusses how AI patents might
285. See Verweij, supra note 283, at 1048 (“Firms have detailed knowledge of
their cost structure, and they are well positioned to develop new technologies and
to find efficient, practical solutions to [their] problems.”).
286. See id. (arguing that the benefit of having inventors with specific
knowledge of the industry and practice area to develop technology to address the
market issues).
287. See, e.g., Aatif Sulleyman, Google AI Creates Its Own ‘Child’ AI that’s
More Advanced than Systems Built by Humans, INDEPENDENT (Dec. 5 2017, 3:40
PM),
http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/googlechild-ai-bot-nasnet-automl-machine-learning-artificial-intelligence-a8093201. html
(last visited Dec. 4, 2018) (describing Google’s production of an open source neural
network software that markedly improved on the other available programs at the
time) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
288. See W. Michael Schuster, Invalidity Assertion Entities and Inter Partes
Review: Rent Seeking as a Tool to Discourage Patent Trolls, 51 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1163, 1164 (2016) (discussing the development of Invalidity Assertion
Entities and their use of Inter Partes Review to challenge the validity of patents
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further troll litigation if these rights were allocated to software
companies (in contrast to being allocated to AI users, as proposed
herein).
Societal costs associated with patent troll litigation are
substantial.289 Activity of this nature cannot proceed, however,
unless trolls are able to purchase patents.290 That end is furthered
where—as discussed below—patentees have no means of
financially exploiting a patent except selling it. This would be the
situation for many AI patent owners if patent rights were given to
parties other than market participants (e.g., software companies).
There are limits on how software companies may monetize a
patent. As specialized AI firms, these companies will not generally
be engaged in commerce related to the field of the AI’s invention.291
and target patent trolls); see also David Orozco, Administrative Patent Levers, 117
PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 17 (2012) (expressing concerns related to the prevalence of
patent trolls and their negative impact on business); Daniel R. Cahoy, 9 N.Y.U.
J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 587, 640 (2006) (describing the current environment with
patent trolls as a potential crisis); Gregory Day, Competition and Piracy, 32
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 775, 786 (2017) (describing the economic atmosphere of stiff
patent violation penalties which has created the patent troll industry).
289. See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 274, at 423 (finding that the costs from
patent troll lawsuits are “substantial, and . . . correspond to substantial social
costs as well”); see also Richard Posner, Patent Trolls, BECKNER-POSNER BLOG
(July 21, 2013, 5:12 PM), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2013/07/patenttrollsposner.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2018) (“It is extremely difficult to discern
any possible social benefit from trolls, and extremely easy to discern substantial
social costs.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Maayan Perel,
From Non-Practicing Entities (NPEs) to Non-Practiced Patents (NPPs): A
Proposal for A Patent Working Requirement, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 747, 749 n.3 (2015)
(“[A]nnual wealth lost from [non-practicing entity] lawsuits is around $80 billion
for publicly traded U.S. firms and that much of this cost is a social loss not a mere
transfer to [non-practicing entities].”); Fabio E. Marino & Teri H.P. Nguyen, Has
Delaware Become the “New” Eastern District of Texas? The Unforeseen
Consequences of the AIA, 30 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 527, 533 (2014) (“The
social benefits [non-practicing entities] may offer, if any, are minimal and
outweighed by the private and social costs they impose.”). But see Lauren Cohen
et. al., “Troll” Check? A Proposal for Administrative Review of Patent Litigation,
97 B.U. L. REV. 1775, 1807 (2017) (asserting that “the net social costs of [patent
assertion entity—patent troll—]activity remain subject to heated debate”).
290. See Carhart v. Carhart-Halaska Int'l, LLC, 788 F.3d 687, 691 (7th Cir.
2015) (“The commonest example of a law troll is the patent troll, who acquires by
purchase or application to the Patent and Trademark Office a patent that he uses
not to protect an invention but to obtain a license fee from, or legal judgment
against, an alleged infringer.”).
291. See supra Part IV.C (discussing why specialized firms are less likely to
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This constrains their sources of patent value to licensing or sale of
the patent,292 which in turn expands the market for discount
patents (and thus, furthers patent troll activity). Such a conclusion
is made clear though a discussion of avenues available for software
companies to monetize their AI patent holdings.
In some instances, software companies might assign their
patent to downstream AI users (e.g., firms licensing the use of the
AI), and the patent is off the market.293 Likewise, software
companies may sell licenses to use the patented technology and
retain all substantial rights, including the right to sell the patent
and sue for infringement.294 Neither of these situations create
immediate worry.
Patent troll concerns arise where a software company (that
has been allocated relevant patent rights) issues a terminal
number of licenses and is left holding a patent which it has no
intention or capacity to exploit in commerce.295 The economically
rational choice at that point is to sell the patent for any non-zero
engage in commerce in the specific market where their technology will be used).
292. See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 228, at 2129–30 (describing the
method employed by non-practicing entities to make a profit compared with the
ability of practicing entities to cross-license their work to reduce costs).
293. See Michael Seringhaus, E-Book Transactions: Amazon “Kindles” the
Copy Ownership Debate, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 147, 181–82 (2010) (discussing the
classification of a downstream licensing agreement of a patented technology as
an assignment of patent rights).
294. See Alfred E. Mann Found. for Sci. Research v. Cochlear Corp., 604 F.3d
1354, 1359–60 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
Either the licensor did not transfer “all substantial rights” to the
exclusive licensee, in which case the licensor remains the owner of the
patent and retains the right to sue for infringement, or the licensor did
transfer “all substantial rights” to the exclusive licensee, in which case
the licensee becomes the owner of the patent for standing purposes and
gains the right to sue on its own.
See also Intellectual Prop. Dev., Inc. v. TCI Cablevision of Cal., Inc., 248 F.3d
1333, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[A] nonexclusive license . . . confers no constitutional
standing on the licensee under the Patent Act to bring suit or even to join a suit
with the patentee because a nonexclusive (or ‘bare’) licensee suffers no legal injury
from infringement.”).
295. See, e.g., Tim Carmody, When Startups Fail, Investors Recoup by Selling
Patents, WIRED (Aug. 11, 2011, 12:02 PM), https://www.wired.com/
2011/08/startups-fail-sell-patents/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2018) (discussing the
tendency of companies to sell patents when they can no longer profit by selling
licenses) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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sum.296 This can positively reflect on the bottom line without
inhibiting the rights of past licensees.297 This act, however,
additionally benefits trolls looking to purchase inexpensive
patents.298
A sale of this nature will occur at a discounted rate because all
prior licensing opportunities would rationally have been explored,
along with any serious assignment opportunities.299 This situation
plays into a common troll business tactic—purchasing discounted
patents for subsequent litigation.300 Accordingly, assigning AI
patent rights to software companies would further the patent troll
business model. This creates new societal costs and deviates from
the stated goal of economic efficiency (i.e., maximizing societal
296. See Stephen Bainbridge, Contractarianism in the Business Associations
Classroom: Kovacik v. Reed and the Allocation of Capital Losses in Service
Partnerships, 34 GA. L. REV. 631, 661 n.99 (2000) (summarizing the ultimatum
game where the entity facing a potential loss should settle for any non-zero offer).
297. See TCI Cablevision of Cal., 248 F.3d at 1337 (determining that though
one party granted a nonexclusive license to another party, the previous party
maintained the ability to bring a suit).
298. Patent trolls commonly attempt to purchase their patents at discounted
rates. See Ian Polonsky, You Can’t Go Home Again: The Righthaven Cases and
Copyright Trolling on the Internet, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 71, 72–73 (2012) (“The
patent troll model works as follows: the troll seeks out opportunities to buy
patents on the cheap, often during bankruptcy auctions or from producers hoping
to sell under-utilized patents to fund other research projects.”); see also David B.
Heedy, Has Alice Brought Us to Patent Wonderland?: Can the Supreme Court’s
New Analysis of Abstract Ideas Affect the Current Problems Associated with
Business-Method and Software Patents, 15 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 57, 62 (2016)
(characterizing the patent troll business model as one of buying patents from
firms who do not have enough capital to enforce patents themselves);
Overstock.com, Inc. v. Furnace Brook, LLC, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1218 (D. Utah
2005) (patent troll “purchased its patent at a bankruptcy auction in 2003 and,
without any apparent attempts to practice it, has since sent infringement letters”
to numerous large companies), aff’d, 191 Fed. Appx. 959 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
299. See Erik Oliver et al., When Do Operating Companies Sell Their Patents,
IPWATCHDOG (Aug. 16, 2016), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/08/16/operatingcompanies-sell-their-patents/id=71890/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2018) (performing
empirical analyses on the sale prices of patents to non-practicing entities to
demonstrate that the likely cause of discounted patent sales is poor company
health); see also supra notes 295–296 and accompanying text (discussing the
economic pressure to sell for any non-zero sum when the company can no longer
exploit the patent).
300. See supra note 298 and accompanying text (describing the need to
purchase patents at discounted rates to fulfil the patent troll model).
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surplus).301 Such an allocation of AI patent rights cannot,
therefore, be a preferred policy.
3. Costs Associated with Software Company Patentees
Additional inefficiencies would arise from allocating AI patent
rights to software companies. Coase Theorem—and the
economically efficient state of affairs that it predicts—relies on the
assumption of costless transactions and perfect information.302
Part III.B described how to mimic costless transactions in reality,
but had little need to substantively address the perfect information
assumption. Real world deviation from this assumption would
create substantial costs (and thus economic inefficiencies) if AI
patent rights were allocated to software companies.303
For software companies to successfully exploit AI patent
rights allocated to them, they must be aware of, and capable of
understanding, the means by which their software is being used by
downstream AI users. While potentially able to monitor the
operation and output of its AI, software companies are not
guaranteed a technical understanding of that information. As
discussed in the previous subsection, technical knowledge in the
field of invention is not commonly held by software companies, and
obtaining such expertise would come at the expense of hiring
experts.304
This want of relevant knowledge would create substantial
costs for software companies in two distinct manners. Initially, the
firms must maintain sufficient expertise to recognize what output
(i.e., inventions) are worth the investment of patenting.305 It is a
301. See supra note 289 and accompanying text (identifying the social costs of
patent trolls).
302. See Swygert & Yanes, supra note 186, at 270 (identifying the
assumptions behind Coase Theorem, including “perfect knowledge” and “zero
transaction costs”).
303. See supra notes 298–301 and accompanying text (discussing the
significant social costs and inefficiencies associated with patent troll ownership
of patents).
304. See supra Part IV.C (discussing why specialized firms are less likely to
engage in commerce in the specific market where their technology will be used).
305. See Hansen et al., supra note 282, at 106–07 (discussing how firms
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bad investment to patent all inventions produced by their AI
(including bad ones), and it is likewise foolhardy to patent none of
the inventions.306 The potential patentee must be able to
distinguish the good from the bad.307 Software companies may
secure technical expertise by making new hires or exchanging
patent licenses for relevant knowhow.308 Regardless of the path
chosen, however, the company is incurring additional expenses
and deducting from economic efficiency.309
A related cost comes from the expense of policing AI users.310
Were software firms to be allocated the right to AI patents, they
would need to be vigilant against attempts by users of their
software to illicitly patent technologies in the users’ own name.
Should an AI user create a particularly valuable invention, there
are significant financial incentives to secure a patent with an
employee of the firm incorrectly listed as the inventor. Absent
recognition of the illicit activity and subsequent legal action, this
would cut the software company out of income from the AI patent.
To avoid such losses, significant policing measures would need
be taken by the software firm. Initially, it would have to review
patent filings by downstream users of its AI and compare them to
maintain organizational knowledge relevant to their field of expertise).
306. See, e.g., Stephen Key, Software Startups: This Is How You Craft a Patent
Strategy,
FORBES
(June
27,
2018,
5:12
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/stephenkey/2018/06/27/software-startups-this-ishow-you-craft-a-patent-strategy/#21973d591fee (last visited Dec. 4, 2018)
(discussing the general drawbacks of patenting software in certain circumstances
and not patenting in others) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
307. See Verweij, supra note 283, at 1048 (“Firms have detailed knowledge of
their cost structure, and they are well positioned to develop new technologies and
to find efficient, practical solutions to [their] problems.” (alteration in original)).
308. See supra notes 231–235 and accompanying text (demonstrating that the
parties not participating in the actual manufacturing process are more likely to
not engage directly in the relevant market).
309. See discussion supra Part IV.B (discussing the tendency for parties
participating in the market to value the patents most).
310. See Edward Brunet & David J. Sweeney, Integrating Antitrust Procedure
and Substance After Northwest Wholesale Stationers: Evolving Antitrust
Approaches to Pleadings, Burden of Proof, and Boycotts, 72 VA. L. REV. 1015, 1028
(1986) (discussing the costs of policing contract compliance); see also Note, CBS v.
ASCAP: Performing Rights Societies and the Per Se Rule, 87 YALE L.J. 783, 786
(1978) (describing the enormity of the costs associated with policing the
contracts).
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the invention output of its software. To effectively do so, the
software company must expend resources on technical experts and
patent lawyers to determine whether others are illicitly patenting
inventions arising from its AI. Beyond the mere cost of such
policing, this type of activity is likely to further decrease economic
efficiency through legal expenses and soured business
relationships should misdeeds be identified. This host of additional
costs detract from economic efficiency, and again, disfavors
allocation of AI patent rights to software companies.
E. Future Research
This Article presents the first significant analysis of the
allocation of patent rights arising from AI invention. There are, not
surprisingly, a variety of other issues in this nascent field that
warrant future research. This subpart briefly recognizes several of
these issues.
A majority of the literature and commentary believes that AI
patents will eventually be issued,311 and indeed, this Article
proceeds under that expectation. There are, however, a variety of
policy issues underlying this determination that should be fully
vetted in the literature. Initially, refusing to issue AI patents
creates several incentives that cut against public policy. A primary
goal of the patent system is dissemination of technological
advances.312 Refusing to issue AI patents, however, encourages
inventing software users to maintain their inventions as a trade
secret (if possible) because public disclosure makes the technology
available to competitors with no benefit to the inventor beyond a
head start in the marketplace.313 Such a policy likewise incents
311. See, e.g., Hattenbach & Glucoft, supra note 12, at 51 (citing the
adherence to the “Constitutional objective of advancing the progress of useful
arts” as the reason for future allowance of AI patents); Abbott, supra note 9, at
1081–82. (arguing that AI ownership should not be prevented by the history of
the “Copyright Office’s Human Authorship Requirement”). This belief is not,
however, universally held. See Ravid & Xiaoqiong, supra note 121, at 2222
(arguing for the abolishment of patent protections for AI created inventions).
312. See Miller, supra note 115, at 1067 (citing the goal of copyright is
progress).
313. See Symposium, A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of
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deceit in naming a human as inventor where a technology was
actually created by AI. This type of duplicitousness could
successfully circumvent a ban on AI patents, as the Patent Office
will not investigate or reject applications for failures to correctly
name an inventor.314 Patents issued under such subterfuge are
subject to invalidation,315 but the owner will enjoy the same
benefits as a legitimate patentee until their patent is invalidated
(if caught).316
A contrary policy argument recognizes that AI invention is
relatively low in cost, and thus, does not need the incentive of a
patent to be undertaken. It could likewise be argued that such
low-cost invention and patenting creates social costs in the form of
patent thickets.317 Future research is warranted to address these
arguments.
Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2409 (1994) (arguing that the
market-oriented regimes would reduce wasteful duplications by both ensuring
return on investment and removing the need for companies to keep discoveries
trade secrets); Luigi Alberto Franzoni & Arun Kumar Kaushik, The Optimal
Scope of Trade Secrets Law, 45 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 45, 45 (2016) (asserting that
excessive secrecy slows down the dissemination of information in a way that does
a disservice to the economy and people).
314. See Aaron X. Fellmeth, Conception and Misconception in Joint
Inventorship, 2 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENVTL. L. 73, 117 (2012) (“[T]he PTO
virtually never questions the applicant's assertions of inventorship when
examining the patent.”); see also 37 CFR § 1.56 (2018) (providing the patent
disclosure requirements); Honeywell Int'l Inc. v. Maltseff, No. C14-0283JLR, 2014
WL 3360334, at *2 (W.D. Wash. July 9, 2014) (finding the claim does not rest
solely on invention disclosures); 2018 MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
§ 2010 (MB 2018) (“[T]he examiner will not comment upon duty of disclosure
issues which are brought to the attention of the Office except to note . . . that such
issues are not considered by the examiner during examination of patent
applications . . . .”).
315. See Kennedy v. Hazelton, 128 U.S. 667, 672 (1888) (“A patent which is
not supported by the oath of the inventor, but applied for by one who is not the
inventor, is unauthorized by law, and void, and . . . confers no right as against the
public.”).
316. See Norris Boothe, Exercising a Duty of Clarity: Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig
Instruments, Inc., 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 445, 467 (2015) (describing the value
of patents that the court has not validated or invalidated); see also Susan Navarro
Smelcer, Note, Anticompetitive Use of Administrative Trials in Bargaining over
Patent Rights, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1733 (2016) (describing the choice of when
to go to trial as a value assessment of the patent at that moment).
317. See James Bessen, A Generation of Software Patents, 18 B.U. J. SCI. &
TECH. L. 241, 248 (2012) (describing a patent thicket as the circumstance where

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND PATENT

2003

Moving from patent prosecution and ownership, there are
future issues to be addressed with regard to patent infringement
by AI. For example, assume AI is developed by Company I, licensed
to Company II, and then integrated into a product used by
Company III.318 If the AI independently begins to operate the
product in a manner that infringes on existing patents, which
party is liable (ignoring contractual issues)? Even if no party was
aware of the AI’s “decision” to operate the product in an infringing
manner, liability will arise because “patent infringement is a strict
liability offense.”319 While liability seems appropriate for the
product’s owner (Company III), there are interesting questions of
induced infringement by the others.320 If it was foreseeable that
the AI would begin to behave in an infringing manner, liability
might be found.321 These questions must be vetted in the literature
and courts as the field of AI and invention progress.
V. Conclusion
Invention via AI is the future of innovation. Unfortunately, at
this time, the United States patent regime has yet to address the
issue of how, and whether, it will issue AI patents. This Article
attempts to make progress on this issue by presenting the first
firms acquire a large number of patents and subsequently create a barrier of entry
to the market). A patent thicket is “a dense web of overlapping intellectual
property rights.” Jaffe v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 737 F.3d 14, 19 (4th Cir. 2013)
(citation omitted).
318. Adapted from an example in Hogan Lovells, Artificial Intelligence Drives
New
Thinking
on
Patent
Rights,
LEXOLOGY
(July
15,
2016),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=cfb71b99-e4ac-4a13-96cf7c1fd6e98543 (last visited Dec. 4, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
319. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007), abrogated
on other grounds by Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016).
320. See Carson Optical Inc. v. eBay Inc., 202 F. Supp. 3d 247, 253 (E.D.N.Y.
2016) (describing the standard for induced infringement); see also Lynda J.
Oswald, International Issues in Secondary Liability for Intellectual Property
Rights Infringement, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 247, 256 (2008) (discussing secondary
liability generally).
321. See Jacqueline K.S. Lee et al., Catch Me If You Can: Litigating Artificial
Intelligence Patents, 23 CYBERSPACE LAWYER 1 (Jan./Feb. 2018) (discussing a
similar situation from a contributory infringement perspective).
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substantial consideration on AI patent allocation and societal
efficiency. Such information is of primary importance in the choice
of to whom to grant AI patents. With this in mind, the Article
concludes that, via a Coasean analysis, the rights to AI patent
should be allocated to AI users (i.e., parties using AI to create new
technologies) to maximize economic efficiency.

